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ABSTRACT

A program of family crisis intervention training for police officers was conducted, and the effectiveness of the officers' use of such techniques was evaluated. Twelve police officers were given five to six hours training, five days a week, for five weeks. Training consisted of lectures, films and readings, simulated family crisis interventions, video tape replay sessions, observed field interventions followed by feedback sessions, classroom and field contact with area service agency personnel, and group conferences. During the first three months of precinct work following training, officers returned periodically for case conferences. The data collected at the beginning of and during a five-month evaluation were: (1) a course evaluation; (2) a structured telephone interview with citizens, comparing trained and untrained officers; (3) an opinion questionnaire given trained officers four months into the project; and (4) demographic and descriptive information of interventions made by trained officers. Questionnaire data showed enthusiastic acceptance of the project by policy officers and appreciation of the techniques given them. Interview data showed that citizens were much more satisfied with the way trained officers dealt with them than they were with treatment from untrained officers. Demographic and descriptive data were used to develop background on the nature of family conflict and interpersonal aggression. (Author/KM)

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POLICE TRAINING IN FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION

A Final Report

Submitted to:

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CITY OF LOUISVILLE

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Acknowledgments

Projects such as this rely heavily upon an enthusiasm for effective social action on the part of many persons throughout a community.

Since the initial suggestion to conduct this project at Louisville was made by David A. McCandless, former Dean of the University of Louisville's School of Police Administration, to him we owe an initial debt of gratitude. Two other men, dedicated to the professionalization of Law Enforcement and to service to their community, Mr. George Burton, Director of Safety, and Colonel C. J. Hyde, Chief of Police of the City of Louisville carried the project from the idea stage to the stage of implementation. Thanks are also due Sgt. Bill D. Lamkin, Project Liaison Officer, and Mr. Charles Day, Director of Personnel and Training, for their help in solving many of the day to day problems.

Professor Morton Bard, of the City University of New York, directed us through some initial and uncertain terrain. Bard had first conceived of family crisis intervention training for police officers and had conducted the initial project, after which the present one was modeled. Bard's advice and guidance, based both on his professional competence as a Psychologist and his knowledge of policemen, prevented us from making several unfortunate errors.

University of Louisville staff from the Psychology Department, Kent School of Social Work, and Southern Police Institute were ready to contribute when asked. Community agencies, among them, Family and Children's Agency, HELP Office, West Central Mental Health Center, the State Department of Rehabilitation, and the Area Community Councils lent their assistance where needed.

Actors Theater, The West Side Players, and Beef and Boards provided staff who worked enthusiastically to implement the Training Simulations.

However, most credit must be given the individual officers who entered a completely novel program, submitted to many unusual and taxing requirements, and had the courage to apply techniques, recently learned, under the pressures of the real crisis in the field.

Abstract

A program of Family Crisis Intervention Training for Police Officers represents the application of a set of current psychological techniques to several pressing social needs. The set of psychological techniques consists of those techniques mental helath practitioners have developed as effective in dealing with interpersonal conflict. The social needs to be met are: The need from a mental health viewpoint to service persons with interpersonal difficulties, the need from a crime prevention viewpoint to effect an early reduction in interpersonal aggression (thereby reducing violence) and the societal need to develop policing to a level of professionalism wherein it can deal effectively with the behavior management problems falling within its occupational domain.

Accordingly, this program was designed to instruct police officers in the use of family crisis intervention techniques and to evaluate their effectiveness in the use of such techniques.

Twelve police officers were given five to six hours training, five days a week, for five weeks. This training consisted of lectures on concepts relevant to the understanding of family conflict; films and readings directed to specific policing and/or social problems; simulated family crisis interventions conducted with professional actors; video tape replay sessions

wherein simulations were replayed with commentary from selected actors and a psychologist; field interventions made with observers and followed by feed-back sessions; classroom and field contact with area service agency personnel; and training group conferences.

Following these five weeks of training, officers were assigned to one precinct in such a way that they were likely to handle domestic trouble calls typical of that precinct. Calls were given by the dispatchers to trained officers when they were available but to other officers when trained officers were unavailable. During the first three months of work in the precinct, trained officers returned to the University periodically to participate in, what might best be described as, case conferences.

Several kinds of data were collected at the beginning of and during a five-month evaluation: (a) a course evaluation given the trained officers immediately after training; (b) a structured telephone interview with citizens dealt with by trained compared to untrained officers; (c) an opinion questionnaire given trained officers four months into the project; and (d) demographic and descriptive information of those interventions made by trained officers.

Questionnaire data showed a very enthusiastic acceptance of the project by police officers and a great deal of appreciation of those techniques given them. Interview data showed

that citizens were much more satisfied with the way trained officers dealt with them than did untrained officers. Demographic and descriptive data were used to develop background information bearing on the nature of family conflict and interpersonal aggression.

The Problem of Family Conflict and the Emerging Solution

The Problem

One must assume a societal perspective in order to comprehend why police officers find themselves spending a significant proportion of their on-duty time dealing with families in conflict.

On the surface the reason is that no one else takes the responsibility for mediating family disputes. Of course, this 'no one else' explanation is, admittedly, a superficial one as it stands but becomes meaningful with reference to the fact that in less complex societies--or at least in some societies unlike current American society--dealing with family conflict is the business of the extended family, the immediate kin of the troubled family, or the neighborhood. Family conflict, traditionally, has been regulated by the in-group, itself, and persons outside the immediate group were not expected to interfere. Parents, close relatives, kinship elders, or some other respected and/or legitimate insider mediated with authority, but with the interest of the family and its immediate social extensions in mind.

In modern America, however, social mobility has placed most nuclear families in geographical settings distant from parents, relatives, or even neighbors who could be counted

on to fairly mediate a dispute and to regulate unacceptable behavior on the part of one or both marital partners. Consequently, when a nuclear family in such social isolation has exhausted its internal resources and coping mechanisms for handling conflict, it has no place to turn but to public arbitration. In most cases this public arbitration is provided by the police system.

Thus, it is the social isolation of the nuclear family in current American Society that renders family crisis a problem for authority outside the immediate social fabric of the family. Since the mental health system in most communities is not responsive to this type of problem and is seldom available round-the-clock on short notice, and since many family conflicts involve violence or the potential for violence, the problem has been set squarely upon the shoulders of the police.

Compounding the problem of social isolation is the fact that most contemporary families live under more frequent and more intense stress than encountered by most families living in a less complex and less rapidly changing environment. As recent as two generations ago, America was primarily an agrarian society wherein more simplistic life demands seldom produced the intense sorts of psychological strains on the individual typical of modern society. Interpersonal strains were similarly less problematic since intact value

systems better controlled needs and impulses and conduct was orchestrated by belief and value systems common to the entire culture. Thus, family conflict of the sort dealt with by the police in modern society was probably both less likely and less likely to erupt beyond the confines of the primary group under earlier societal conditions.

Paradoxically, though, the contemporary family (which suffers more stress and has less support from others) is less receptive to help from outside. Reuben Hill (1958) has recognized this paradox by pointing out that:

> When the family is viewed historically, we can see that it is more dependent today than it was formerly on other agencies in society for fulfilling its purposes. Once a self-contained economic and social unit buttressed by kinship supports, the family now has interdependent relations with many other associations in working out its problems.

but, . . . the more open the community (as in the modern city), the more likely the family is closed in form; and the more closed the community (as in the isolated mountain village), the more open are the doors and windows of the family to non-family members.

The Emerging Solution

No single solution to the problem of conflict within the socially-isolated nuclear family has emerged, but several promising efforts are currently being made. Given that few feel that the traditional means of dealing with family conflict can be restored in the form of extended familial or kinship support for the family, agencies external to the family are responding to the problem. Mental

Health service agencies and Social Service agencies have responded out of a professional orientation that views personal and interpersonal difficulties of almost any nature as being within their perview. On the other hand, because the response of these mental health and social agencies is necessarily limited in time, place, and most basically, in terms of authority to use counter-force when necessary, the police system has been given a major part in dealing with "domestic trouble".

Thus, family conflict is dealt with by a variety of agencies (mental health, social service, and police), and this is the form of the emerging solution. The nature of this emerging solution can hardly be argued, since it involves the full range of helping agencies. However, there remain several very real problems which serve as obstacles to the delivery of effective services to families in difficulty. The first problem is resources. Neither the mental health system nor the police system is adequately funded and staffed to respond to the magnitude of this problem. Bard (1970) for instance reports data showing one hundred and seventeen family trouble calls made in one New York precinct in one month, and during August of 1970, trained officers in a Louisville district made some fifty-two family trouble calls. Obviously, if all families were to receive adequate help with their problems an immense professional staff would be required.

The second difficulty--and one about which something can be done--is the failure of mental health, social service, and police systems to coordinate their efforts. From the viewpoint of the police system, coordination around this problem is, at best, restricted because of the uncertain acceptance of family conflict as part of their job, and at worse, is actually rejected because it lies beyond the realm of criminal behavior. Factors which militate against a systematic involvement of the police in an integrated way with other service agencies will be dealt with separately below. Factors which discourage efforts toward a concerted response from the mental health and social service system are related to the historical fact that mental health professionals, in particular, are both person oriented and office oriented. The person orientation has led to individual therapy outside the social context of the problem and to a concentration on mostly personal, rather than interpersonal difficulties. The office orientation suggested that the office, or clinic, was the proper place to practice one's occupation; not someone's home. Consequently, family conflicts were either not dealt with, or were the target of a referral of one person to a clinic.

Fortunately, much of this is changing (see, Speck, 1964), but not to the extent that personal therapy, done within an office or clinic setting, has been displaced as

the usual mode of operation for the mental health practicioner. Even when some innovative agency-wide effort is made, it seldom includes the police who are probably most deeply engaged in responding to families in difficulty at the time and place of that difficulty. Failure to coordinate with the police system is partly understandable for several reasons; among which are the perceived subprofessional status of the police officer, his reluctance and inability to deal with these problems, and the perception on the part of both mental health and police personnel that their jobs involve drastically different client populations, different settings, and different goals. These perceptions represent a myoptic view of the response of the social system to interpersonal difficulties and fail to recognize that an integrated response to interpersonal conflict will, in the end, require a coordinated police, mental health, and social service effort.

Other misperceptions and biases on the side of the police prove equally destructive in a cooperative effort with mental health and social service agencies. Because most policemen feel defeated when criminals are not prosecuted to the full extent of the law or when prisoners are released early, they feel that the legal and helping systems are working at odds to effective policing and the maintenance of social order. This feeling eventuates in a mistrust of the legal and helping professions and in its more severe stages, an open hostility towards them.

Operating in conjunction with this disaffection is the fact that the average police officer is conceptually ill equipped for understanding the complexities of rehabilitation and the innuendoes of dealing with human problems. The jargon-hidden goals and aspirations of the mental health and social welfare systems fall beyond his comprehension. The distrust and hostility directed to him from mental health and social service professionals (who are similarly insensitive to the different problems encountered by the policeman and to the somewhat different orientation imposed by them) eventuate in a very high level of mutual antagonism.

It is indeed unfortunate that mental health practicioners fail to foster close cooperation with the police since the police can offer much to the overall mental health effort of a community. As Bard (1970) points out, police services might be included within a preventative mental health program wherein police officers are used as paraprofessional mental health and social workers. Specifically, the police as paraprofessional mental health agents are in a position to operate as casefinders, thereby detecting potentially disruptive personal and familial situations prior to a complete breakdown. In addition, effective on-the-spot intervention by police might reduce violence potential, aid toward a solution of the immediate difficulty, and shield impressionable children from an otherwise disturbing experience.

The Role of the Police in the Solution

Basic to the failure of the police system to respond adequately to family conflict is an uncertainty about the role of policing in a modern, democratic society and about the legitimacy of the many non-crime related aspects of police work. Egon Bittner (1970), upon whom we rely heavily in this section, cites the problem as follows:

> Because the idea that the police are basically a crime-fighting agency has never been challenged in the past, no one has troubled to sort out the remaining priorities. Instead, the police have always been forced to justify activities that did not involve law enforcement in the direct sense by either linking them constructively to law enforcement or by defining them as nuisance demands for service. The dominance of this view, especially in the minds of policemen, has two pernicious consequences. First, it leads to a tendency to view all sorts of problems as if they involved culpable offenses and to an excessive reliance on quasi-legal methods for handling them. Second, the view that crime control is the only serious, important, and necessary part of police work has deleterious effects on the morale of those police officers in the uniformed patrol who spend most of their time with other matters.

It is generally recognized, then, that police reject 'family trouble' as a legitimate aspect of their job, place low priority upon it, and fail to reward activities so directed. The begrudging response to a family in conflict is thus, usually either legalistic ("take a warrant, lady") or coercive insofar as a troublesome party is ejected temporarily. Such actions are indicated both from the criminal-victim paradigm imposed upon the conceptual system of the individual officer by the exclusive crime control philosophy

of the police system and by the quasi-military structure which, together with the many demands to quick action, discourage modes of thought adequate in their abstraction and complexity for effective action in interpersonal conflicts. On the other hand, policing, as a profession, would be wise to accept certain service functions; among them emergency medical aid and first-line processing of interpersonal conflict. Without such a helping aspect, policing (no matter how efficient in crime control) will probably fail to attain professional status. Professionals for the most part are engaged in activities judged unequivocally desirable by members of society. The doctor, educator, and lawyer, all provide services which, except for a tolerably few deviations, are desired and judged good by all. The policeman, however, in the crime control areas of his job enjoys no such clear cut advantage since he is always interfering with the attainment of one person's or group's goals for the sake of preserving the ends of another person or group.

The policeman, in his exclusively control functions, proceeds against freedom of action and of speech in the interest of the common good. Nevertheless, he constantly violates a value in its absolute form and, thus, his actions are most often equivocal with respect to these values.

It is only in the service areas of his job that a police officer can escape this paradox of always violating some value. When emergency medical aid is given, the officer proceeds for life and against no other value. When he helps a family in conflict, he proceeds for peace and harmony, and against few important values. Thus, for the sake of professional regard within contemporary American society, the policeman should accept the major aspects of his service role and develop expertise in them. If he fails to engage in service and adopts a strict military, crime-control stance, he will probably not attain professional status, and the problem of policing a complex, modern, democratic society will be exacerbated.

It requires absolutely no fabrication to place family crises squarely within the perview of the police system. Since the police are the only agents of the society licensed to use counter-force against citizens prior to litigation, and since scores of family crises require the use of counter-force to prevent and/or offset violence directed toward one or toward both parties, the police are the logical initial intervention agents in such situations. It is foolhardy to ignore the potential violence of domestic disputes, since most homicides occur among family members. As Wolfgang (1958) points out following an analysis of homocides in Philadelphia:

> A majority of homicides involve persons closely related in primary group contacts. In 65% of the cases the victim was a close friend of the killer, a family member, paramour, or homosexual partner. Forty-one percent of the female victims were killed by their husband.

Even short of homicide, assault most often occurs between persons intimately acquainted. As the 1967 FBI Uniform Crime Report indicated: "Most aggrivated assaults occur within the family unit or among neighbors or acquaintences. The victim and offender relationship, as well as the very nature of the attack, makes this crime similar to murder."

It is, thus, obvious that the primary group is the setting for homicide and the context for most person-directed violence. It is also obvious that one of the few effective preventative measures to be leveled against homicide and assault in a society structured such as ours is a quick, efficient, intervention by police officers. Thus, if policing is going to take seriously its crime prevention function, it must equip itself to deal with interpersonal conflict within the primary group--the family.

Crisis Intervention by Police

Beyond the fact that severe family crises are a police matter in their initial stages insofar as they are predictive to violence, is the fact that the policeman is in some ways potentially better equipped to deal with many of them than most other agents of society. Such a

potentiality exists through the unique license society has given police: a license to use counter-force against all citizens. The mental health practicioner, for instance, is licensed at best to use counter-force against a specified patient population and in intervening in a family dispute may not legally take recourse to restraint or coersion. Since most will agree that effective social control is dependent on the range of outcomes available to the controlling agent and his ability to use them, it must be conceded that the policeman is in an enviable position in this respect. Relatedly, since family disputes often involve violence and since professionals, other than the police, are neither authorized nor often capable of meeting violence, the removal of the police from this area of human confrontation would likely result either in the vulnerability of another type of professional to injury or death, or in the failure to deal with familial disputes while still in potentially violent stages of confrontation.

Beyond the necessity of employing a police officer in domestic interventions because of his sanctioned role as an agent of counter-violence, there are actually unique opportunities for him to act as an effective intervention agent which arise from his official capacity. First, it must be recognized that a police officer is a legally constituted authority and as such possesses different stimulus

properties than the mental health agent or the social worker. In his legitimately constituted role, a police officer is probably more often perceived as a more legitimate intervention agent than a mental health worker under the circumstances of most family crises. He is representative of the community as a whole, has that community's backing, and is powerful in terms of the action alternatives available to him. In short, disputants are compelled by the officer's position to accept his presence in the crisis as a sanctioned agent of society.

Secondly, the fact that the police officer usually arrives at the point of crisis in family conflagrations offers other possibilities for his intervention roles. Caplan (1961) has noted that the turmoil in which the crisis-plagued individual finds himself often makes him particularly pliable. Characteristically, the person realizes that he has exhausted his repertoire of coping behaviors and that he is no longer capable of handling the situation. Consequently, he becomes more susceptible to influence that will direct him to more adaptive behaviors. Unfortunately, few officers have the behavioral science training necessary for an efficient crisis intervention and more often than not, crises are met with reluctance, a legalistic orientation, and action predicated upon criminal-victim paradigm. However, given some training

in family crisis intervention the policeman might reasonably be expected to deal with violent crises effectively. Furthermore, the officer might offer services on a plane somewhat above those available from kin in the traditional mode of meeting these problems though, admittedly, not as adequate as a professional mental health or social worker. Such training should provide the behavioral science competency needed for the officer to deal with family crises commensurate with the responsibility given him by society to mediate these particular areas of human conflict.

Goals

The intent of the present project was to provide the basic behavioral science competency needed of police officers in family crises by way of a specialized training program in domestic crisis intervention for a group of Louisville officers. The goal of this training in crisis intervention was to enable officers to better handle the family crisis which, in turn, should eventuate in a reduction in the incidence of violence stemming from domestic trouble.

Effectiveness in the immediate crisis was the initial concern of the training. Here, the officer's task was to effect a reduction in the emotional tension between persons involved and a subsequent re-orientation toward adaptive problem solution. When problems were chronic, the officers

were to attempt a referral to a service agency. Ultimately, though, effective crisis intervention by police officers should result in a reduction in the incidence of violence. Officers making domestic trouble runs should be less likely to incur violence and citizens should be more effectively deterred from inflicting violence on one another. As a consequence assault and murder statistics should decrease in areas serviced by trained officers.

This two-step process of effective crisis intervention with its consequence in violence reduction provides a choice of two points at which evaluation efforts might be directed. On the surface, evaluation of violence reduction might seem the more desirable option, but unfortunately its assessment rests upon the validity of crime statistics. Crime statistics, though, have many shortcomings which make them inappropriate for evaluation of a project such as this; of which the most serious is their sizable natural variation within samples no larger than police districts. Several major problems associated with the use of crime statistics will be discussed in the procedure section of this paper.

The option of evaluating at the point of the crisis intervention, though perhaps not as compelling as a focus on crime statistics, was taken partly in the face of the practically insurmountable difficulties with crime statistics. This choice, however, is not an intrinsically

undesirable one, since most persons, we believe, would agree that the direct demonstration of effective crisis intervention by police would be a significant step in demonstrating the effectiveness of crisis intervention training.

Intensive Training

Despite the pressing need to provide police officers with training in crisis intervention, few police academies offer even a semblance of such training. To document this failure and to provide a comparison for the present training program, a brief description of the training received in one typical major police department will be provided.

Parnas (1967) describes what he found to be the extent of training in family crisis intervention in the Chicago Department:

> The Chicago Police Department program for recruits consists of 490 hours of diversified training in a 14 week period. Although no lecture in this curriculum deals solely with the domestic disturbance, there is a lecture dealing with disturbances of all kinds. Somewhat related courses in psychology, social problems, minority groups, and public relations are provided.
>
> The lecture on disturbances is allowed one hour in the recruit training program. The teaching outline for that hour of instruction acknowledges that "disturbance calls outnumber any of the other type of calls the officer receives." In reference to domestic disturbances, the outline states that "the majority of these calls are non-criminal calls and don't warrant any punative action," and that "most disturbances can be settled by a common sense explanation (The officer acts as a mediator)." Other alternatives given are: "a. Referral to their attorney; b. Referral to some other public agency; (and) c. Others require more positive action." The recruit is further advised to not "incur criticism and hostility from persons involved. . .be diplomatic. . .(and) be familiar with the laws of arrest and be able to apply them with discression." (p. 916-917)

Parnas (1967) observes:

> The overall emphasis in training seems to be on the danger in handling domestic disturbances. No substantial effort is made to discuss the nature of domestic problems that give rise to such disturbances, the police role in handling these situations, or the available alternatives and their application. Nor is any effort made to explore the peculiar psychology of these disputes that grows out of the intimate relationship between the disputants. (p. 920)

As can be seen, the activity that is admittedly most common for police officers usually receives only passing mention, and only cursory efforts are made to train officers to deal effectively with family disturbances.

Overview of Intensive Training

In contrast to usual training procedures, intensive training in the present program consisted of five to seven hours of training each weekday for a five week period. Its purpose was to cover content areas of Psychology and Sociology relevant to the understanding of family conflict, to develop techniques for family crisis intervention, to provide the officers opportunities to practice these techniques in various situations, and to acquaint officers with community resources bearing on this problem area. In addition, formal training groups were conducted which, along with personal contact with the staff, were meant to deal with personal problems and uncertainties usually generated by the attack on common conceptions about human behavior typical of programs such as the present one.

Facilities for training were provided by the Psychology Clinic at the University of Louisville and included a seminar room, two group rooms, a laboratory with a large observation room, and several offices for police officers.

The approach of the program staff was one which emphasized a cooperative effort between educators and police officers, involved officers in as many decisions as possible, and fostered learning from one another. Philosophically, the orientation was one in which educators and police officers were mutually involved in changing policing techniques wherein officers brought their expertise in police matters and training staff offered their expertise as educators and behavioral scientist. As an example of some of the implications of this philosophy, psychological testing of officers was precluded on the grounds that it was inimical to treating officers as partners in the enterprise. Testing is, of course, more compatible with a subject-experimenter relationship and the use of tests would have signaled officers that their relationship to the training staff was that of subordinates to supervisors.

Related to the whole issue of treating officers as partners in this enterprise and recognizing their expertise in practical policing, was the decision to avoid practices directly related to sensitivity training. There were several reasons for this decision: First, direct attacks

upon an officer's attitudes and values would be inconsistent with the partnership relationship outlined above. Within a strict interpretation of this relationship, sensitivity training could be accepted only if the training staff also underwent a sort of sensitivity experience along with officers. More to meet requirements of a joint officer-educator relationship than to avoid submitting the staff to sensitivity training, it was decided to forgo all direct efforts at attitude and value change. One might perhaps feel that too much is being made of the nature of the relationship between staff and officers, but, given the passive patterns of behaviors developed within most police departments as quasi-military systems, policemen are all too ready to execute behaviors under direction but to forget them once that direction is removed. Involvement on the part of the officers was, thus, considered a basic necessity. Secondly, officers of the Louisville Division of Police had been submitted to sensitivity-training procedures a few years earlier, and these required sessions produced a violent counterreaction. This sensitivity program left a residual resentment for anything related to sensitivity training that, to associate the present program with such efforts, would engage a substantial amount of resistance.

Admittedly, though, the major reason for rejecting a sensitivity-training approach was that it was not

compatible with the theoretical predilections of the training staff. Without exception, the training staff were behaviorally oriented, and such an orientation, of course, prescribes certain approaches while precluding others. In training, the approach indicated was one of practicing techniques of intervention with emphasis on feedback and reinforcement for appropriate actions. The context for understanding family problems and intervention tactics was Exchange Theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) and Behavior Modification (Wolpe, Salter, and Reyna, 1964), respectively.

Approaches to training provide a point of comparison between the New York and Louisville projects. Bard (1970) considered the approach to training as one of two key design issues (p. 6), and seemed to feel that attitude change is essential for training police officers to successfully intervene in family disputes. He says:

> It was recognized that the skills required for effective intervention in highly volatile family crises would, in a large measure, be dependent upon significant alteration of the interpersonal perceptual set of each participating police officer. To insure gradual change over time in personal attitudes and values in order to develop necessary interpersonal objectivity, traditional classroom instructional methods had to be supplemented by innovative educational techniques.

It cannot be argued that innovative educational techniques are needed in programs such as these, but it can be argued whether effective training must involve a direct

attack on attitudinal and value structures. Rather, innovative training techniques might be brought to bear on the problem of eliciting appropriate behavior and reinforcing its occurrence. Must the officer be changed as a person or must he merely be shown that there are effective methods for dealing with family crises?

More agreement exists here than disagreement and the differences being discussed here are not so major as to make the present project something short of a structural replication of the New York project. It is rather one of those differences that can be used to assess the generality of such training programs as conducted at different locations and with different personnel. Such differences in emphasis are inevitable, and robustness, in terms of being tolerant of such differences, is a mark in favor of the basic program. It is within this context--the robustness of the program--that differences between the behaviorally oriented training conducted at Louisville and the affective-experiential training conducted at New York must be considered. Little direct evidence can be brought to bear on the question of superiority of these two approaches, though success of the Louisville project might attest to the sufficiency of the more direct, more easily executed, behavioral training approach.

Project Staff

The senior staff of the project consisted of Dr. James M. Driscoll, a Social Psychologist, and Drs. Robert G. Meyer and Willard A. Mainard, both Clinical Psychologists. This staff, prior to the initiation of the project had the benefit of several consultation sessions with Dr. Morton Bard.

Two advanced graduate students in Clinical Psychology, Mr. James P. Bloch and Mr. Stephen A. White, were recruited as training assistants. Later in the project, Mr. Charles F. Schanie, a graduate student in Social Psychology, was placed in charge of evaluation. Mr. J. Carleton Riddick, another advanced clinical graduate student, was given responsibility for simulations and feedback sessions.

Police Personnel

Police officers were recruited by superiors within the Louisville Division of Police, who provided some thirteen volunteers. Dr. Meyer interviewed each of these men and judged twelve of the thirteen acceptable for the project. Consequently, it was only in retrospect that some assessment of the type of men sent to the project could be made, wherein it became obvious that all men were not willing volunteers: indeed, enough rapport was developed between police officers and trainers that officers readily admitted that their reasons for volunteering for the project were diverse and not always admirable. A few officers truly

volunteered out of a desire to learn some new and potentially useful techniques. Others volunteered to avoid some disliked assignment, while a few saw the five weeks of training as perhaps a substantial vacation from their regular duties. (Table 2-1 lists several relevant characteristics of these men).

Two and one half weeks into the program one officer left the force to take a position on a police force in his home state, Alaska. This officer, however, requested that we let him complete as much of the program as time permitted, and he did so on his own time. Officer Wheatly was recruited as a replacement and the other officers in the project worked conscientiously along with the project staff to teach officer Wheatly what had been missed up to that point.

The extent to which the police officers in the Louisville project were selected is an important issue since it forms a potential point of comparison with the New York Project which used highly selected men. Accordingly, some basic data on crisis unit officers is presented in Table 2-2 for comparison with a nominal group formed by a random selection of twelve patrolmen from the Louisville force. As can be seen, men of the crisis unit were some 4.4 years younger than the average of the nominal group and had 5.6 years less experience. However, if crisis unit officers and officers of the nominal group are ordered by age, it

Table 2-1
Data on FCIU Officers

Name	Age	Race	Educa.	Marital Status	District	Yrs. in Police
John Ansman	32	W	H.S.	M	3rd	7 yrs.
John Beckman	26	W	B.S.	S	2nd	1 yr.
Jim Brown	32	N	H.S.	M	4th	1 yr.
Alton Embry	23	W	H.S. & few college hours	M	3rd	2 ½ yrs.
John Hughes	48	W	11th grade	M	3rd	20 yrs.
Marvin Lawless	30	W	H.S.	M	3rd	7 ½ yrs.
James Oney						
Paul Parris	24	N	H.S.	S	4th	1 ½ yr.
Roy Parsons	50	W	H.S.	M	2nd	21 yrs.
Jim Sherrard	34	W	H.S.	M	3rd	5 yrs.
Dave Tucker	22	W	H.S.	M	3rd	1 ½ yr.

can be seen that eight of the twelve men of the crisis unit can be paired with a nominal group counterpart within three years of age; either younger or older. Nearly the same holds true for date-joined-the-force; half of the men from the crisis unit and nominal group can be paired in experience within one year. If anything only three men of the crisis unit would have to be replaced by older men to make the unit representative of the Louisville force as described here by our nominal group.

It seems, then, that the twelve men recruited for the crisis intervention project represented something not too discrepant from a cross section of the Louisville police force, rather than a highly selected group of police officers. At least, a comparison of selection procedures against those used in the New York project suggests that trainees of the Louisville project were much more representative of policemen in general.

Bard (1970) decided early to limit the New York project to volunteers ". . .with at least three years, but no more than ten years, of service." Eighteen men were selected from forty-two volunteers in the New York project, whereas in the Louisville project only thirteen were provided and twelve found acceptable. In contrast to the three to ten years experience range of the New York Project, men ranged in age from 23 to 52 years and in seniority from 22 to 2 years. Thus, it would seem that there

exists a basis for comparison between the two family crisis training projects in terms of the selection required in order to assure success.

Since training selected personnel is always easier than training unselected personnel and since part of the benefit of the New York Project might have been due to the concentration of natively talented policemen on a problem rather than the training they received, success here with much less selected men will, of course, be extremely useful in judging the value of the training program, itself.

Selection of Teams

It was a policy of the staff to involve police officers in decisions about the program as much as possible and to work with them more as participants in the program rather than mere trainees. Thus, when it came time to pair officers into teams, the problem was broached with the men in a morning feedback session. After stating the necessity for forming teams which would be permanent for the six month planned evaluation, several methods were suggested for the pairing of men. These methods ranged from an arbitrary assignment by staff to the use of sociometric techniques. It is, however, a testimony to the rapport between staff and trainees that the men rejected all such techniques in favor of deciding assignments for themselves in light of several considerations

Table 2-2
Descriptive Data on Louisville Family Crisis Intervention Unit

Crisis Unit[1]	Twelve Randomly Selected Patrolmen	Diff.
	Date of Birth	
RKP	1919	1917	2
JMH	1922	1917	5
JAS	1935	1918	17
JNB	1937	1922	15
JAA	1938	1924	14
MAL	1939	1937	2
JEO	1940	1942	+2
FW	1941	1944	+3
JAB	1944	1944	0
PHP	1946	1945	1
APE	1946	1945	1
DGT	1947	1946	1
Average	1937.8	1933.4	
	Date Joined Force		Diff.
RKP	1949	1942	7
JMH	1950	1943	8
MAL	1963	1949	14
JAA	1964	1949	15
JEO	1965	1950	15
JAS	1965	1959	4
APE	1967	1967	0
FW	1968	1967	1
PHP	1968	1968	0
DGT	1969	1968	1
JNB	1969	1968	1
JAB	1969	1969	0
Average	1963.8	1958.2	

[1]Ordered chronologically for the sake of comparison

involved in working with a partner as a policeman; factors not always admitted to publically. Such considerations are well documented by Wambaugh (1970) and involve questions of the proper relationships between officers and eating places, women, and minor criminal activity.

In respect for the fact that the officers knew more about such things than the staff and were, in the end, the ones who had to live with their partners, they were left free to work out their own partnerships and to report them to the staff at the end of the day. No complaints were made to the staff and no partners separated before the end of the evaluation.

Presentations, Readings, and Films

Presentations with discussions were intended to provide trainees with information basic to the understanding of problems in family crisis and with the background needed for application of the techniques to be taught. Thus, they received presentations on the role of the police in family disputes, new concepts of police work, causes of behavior, effects of early experience, changing behavior, abnormal behavior, children in families, family structure and interaction, and alcohol and drug abuse. Following each presentation, time was set aside for questions addressed to the presentor and for a discussion of the topic with the presentor and between the trainees themselves.

Material basic to an understanding of the dynamics of the problem was concentrated in the early part of training and was reduced as material on methods and techniques was increased. Thus, starting with the second week, officers began to receive presentations on such topics as: abnormal behavior and how to handle it, the crisis as an opportunity for change, techniques of conflict resolution, how to make referrals, hints on interviewing, and legal aspects of family crisis intervention. Again all presentations were followed by an opportunity to question the presentor and to engage in a discussion of the topic with emphasis on practical application of the material.

Review, extension, and integration of the above material was done in training groups, in morning feedback sessions, and in informal contact between officers and staff.

Readings and films were used to suppliment and extend presentations while simultaneously providing the implicit support gained through the use of multiple media. Titles of readings and films can be found in Appendix B, which is the entire schedule for the five-week intensive training program.

An important aspect of training not too well reflected in the listed readings is one of persistent concern for police officers involved in such training--the definition

of the policeman's job and how such training relates to that role. Many contemporary forces provide more than enough uncertainty even when the role is traditionally defined, but when such innovative ideas as family crisis intervention is included, the average policeman is, to say the least, a bit confused. Thus, much work has to be done relating the concept of crisis intervention to policing and policing to the demands of our complex urban society. Some sort of rationale for the involvement of the police in family crises is needed. The major lines of the rationale we suggest build off the acceptable position that it is the policeman's job to handle violence. Since family disputes often involve violence or the threat of violence and since professionals, other than the police, are neither authorized nor often capable of meeting violence, the removal of the police from this area of human confrontation would likely result either in the vulnerability of another type of professional to injury or death, or in the failure to deal with familial disputes while still in potentially violent stages of confrontation. Once the policeman recognizes the fact that his role in the prevention of violence places him on the scene, he must come to realize that what he does can mean the difference between potential disaster or potential harmony. The officer must accept that in the crisis persons have exhausted their customary

methods of coping with life's problems, and as a consequence have very little direction for their behavior. Thus, violence is often as plausible as reconciliation. The policeman must realize that he can make the difference; that in crisis, people are more frank, open, and ready to change; persons are usually more susceptible to his influence.

The timeliness of the policeman's presence is one argument, but perhaps not as persuasive as one based on the potential for helping as a legally constituded authority of his society. The officer can come to accept his role in family disputes more easily if he can be brought to understand that he is in a unique position to affect people. First off, since most will agree that effective social control is dependent on the range of outcomes available to the controlling agent and his ability to use them, it must be conceded that the policeman is in an enviable position in having alternatives no one else has. Secondly, his authority as a policeman should not be ignored in considering him as an agent for intervention in family crises. Authority is a double-edged sword; it can either hamper an intervention or facilitate it, depending upon many circumstances. Nonetheless, the policeman must recognize that he is a legally constituted authority, and as such, possesses different stimulus properties than the mental health worker under the circumstances of most family crises. He

is a representative of the community as a whole, has that community's backing, and is powerful in terms of the action alternatives the community makes available to him. In addition, he is also perceived as worldly through his everyday dealings with every sort of human weakness and is often seen as capable of dealing with the not-too-wholesome aspects of life.

These things put the police officer in a unique and probably advantageous position to make family crises interventions; particularly in those kinds of cases where he is usually called and in which disorderly conduct, at least, has occurred.

Of course, police officers are not expected to become psychotherapists, and during intensive training they must constantly be reminded that they will remain patrolmen after the project. The major difference will be that they have acquired a set of basic skills in an area in which they have a genuine responsibility and in which they can indeed affect the lives of the persons with whom they come into contact. Accordingly, the practical end of intervention techniques must always be salient because these men must--with very little actual understanding--do the job of crisis intervention on a day-to-day basis. This is why concrete lists of techniques and rather specific prescriptions on alternative courses of action are provided

such as the following steps in crisis intervention offered by Bard (1970):

1. Prevent violence by separating the disputants.
2. Allow only one person to talk at a time.
3. Take the disputants into separate rooms.
4. Switch officers so that the stories can be checked out.
5. In listening to the stories, try to find out in each case what each individual contributed to the conflict.
6. If one of the disputants holds himself to blame, find out in what ways the other shares the blame.
7. Ask questions so as to get the details as clear as possible.
8. Find out if there has been a previous history of this kind of behavior.
9. See if the history goes back to before the marriage to other relationships or similar relationships in the present.
10. Give each person the opportunity to speak in detail.
11. Bring the couple together to tell their stories to each other. Again, make sure only one person speaks at a time.
12. Point out similarities and discrepancies in the stories.
13. Point out the part that each is playing.
14. Get a reaction from both about what the officers say they see is going on.
15. Ask what the couple plan to do in response to what has transpired and to the officers' reactions. If they seem to understand and say they want to try to work it out, accept it.
16. If you disagree with their response, suggest that they seek other help. If necessary, make the referral.
17. Tell them that if there is another dispute and they see that they are coming close to violence or to repeating the same pattern they should go again for counseling or contact the FCIU.
18. While noting that there will be further difficulties, assure them that if they sit down and talk at least they can come out in the open and try to resolve it.
19. If not in the beginning, then before you leave, make sure that they know your name.

Training should, of course, provide the patrolman with the basis for understanding why he should proceed according to a scheme such as the above, but it is imperative that such schemes be provided him along with the practice in their application.

Field Trips

Two field trips were arranged to take place at opportune times in the intensive training program with an eye toward impressing upon the officers the importance of community agencies. At this time a condensed listing of referral agencies and a supply of referral slips (see, Appendix B) were given officers and these were to be carried with them at all times when on duty. To supplement instructions on their proper use with direct experience, officers were taken on the first type of field trip: Mental Health agencies. Here, the officers visited either the Region Eight Mental Health Center or the Family and Children's Agency. These trips to service agencies were intended to acquaint officers with the services offered, the personnel involved, the aims of the agencies, and how they really operated. A senior staff person (Dr. Roger M. Gardner and Miss Dru R. Ellison, respectively) described the agency, answered questions, and showed the officers the facilities.

The second type of trip was to Neighborhood Community Action Councils in the third police district, and these

were coordinated by Mr. Clarence H. Amster of the Psychology Department, University of Louisville. Different groups of officers visited either Mr. Kenneth Pyle of the Jackson Area Community Action Council, Mr. Charles Calloway of the California Area Community Action Council, or Mr. Russel Washburn of the Manley Area Community Council. These trips to community councils were included mainly to put officers into contact with neighborhood workers so that they knew people who could provide help at the neighborhood level.

Agency trips were supplemented with visits to the program by personnel from various other service agencies. These were Mr. Clarence J. Hettinger, of the Department of Rehabilitation Resources for Retraining for Employment, Mr. Bruce T. Skaggs of the West Central Mental Health Center, and Mr. John R. Hollon of the Drug Abuse and Information Center.

Simulations

In changing long-standing practices, such as those used over the years by police officers in handling "family trouble," changes in behavior based on description go only so far. Most psychologists would agree that to really consolidate such learning the person must actually execute the new behavior and find it successful. Thus, it was decided (for the general reason stated above as well as

on the basis of Bard's strong recommendation) to include simulated family crisis interventions as a major aspect of the training program.

For many reasons, though, there must be a great deal of flexibility in the nature of these simulations. First off, actors have professional orientations that affect the way in which they approach the assignment of simulating family crises and responding to a policeman's intervention. The strength of professional independence on the part of actors was perceived early, and it was decided that rather than impose predesigned assignments on the actors it would be best to use their professional autonomity to the advantage of the project.

Thus, rather than follow the format of the New York project, explicitly, and provide partially written scripts, it was decided to work with groups of actors for new and, hopefully, more creative simulations.

Working with actors in this way proved, we believe, quite beneficial. A week or so before each simulation the project staff worked with Mr. David S. Semonin and Miss Susan C. Kingsley of Actors Theater, Louisville, to decide upon the main story line of the coming simulation and to work-out major themes in terms of the requirements of good stage production and from the viewpoint of good psychology. This, most often, meant that enough

leadway was needed in the script to permit the actors full range of their talents while still insuring that the basic components of interpersonal conflict were left intact. (As a consequence of this freedom, scripts cannot be provided. Instead several simulation report forms are provided in Appendix G which give the flavor of these situations. In addition, these provide information on how officers reacted to simulations and some indication of changes in reactions over training.)

Given the basic story line and conflict themes spelled out by the directors and the training staff, a working session was arranged with all actors. The story line and conflict themes were described and discussed with them until they were clear on what was wanted. These sessions resulted most often in a significant extension of the initial plan given input from the actors and ideas generated by them while they played out the basic scene. Out of such interaction was developed a basic scene which was played out prior to each intervention as a sort of warm up. This scene changed a little each time it was played since a script was never used, but it remained essentially the same in terms of main themes. However once the team of officers arrived, scenes took unpredictable turns since actors were instructed again and again <u>to respond to the officers and what they do from the viewpoint of the role being played</u>.

Because this is quite difficult even for a trained actor it is imperative that simulations not be attempted with amatures.

Because of the importance of simulations both in terms of the concepts of training and in terms of the strength of recommendations from the New York team, more simulations were included in the Louisville project than were used previously. In the New York Project each team of officers were involved in one simulated intervention and observed other teams six times. Three different plays were seen; the one in which each officer intervened and two in which other officers intervened. In the Louisville project each officer intervened in three simulations and observed on the average seventeen others involving three different plays. Each team of officers handled each simulation then went behind a one-way mirror to observe their colleagues handle the same situation. Officers were scheduled so that they did not observe before they intervened.

The last two situations represent somewhat of an innovation insofar as officers in the project devised the story lines for these. Teams of officers were divided in two crews and the separate crews designed plays for their counterparts. In retrospect this seems to be an excellent practice and is highly recommended. Of course the story lines provided by policemen must be refined

again both to fill the requirements of the actors and to fill the requirements of the psychologist-trainer.

Feedback Sessions: Conference with Actors and Video Replay

Again, following the format of the New York Project, feedback sessions were provided wherein the day following the simulation selected actors were asked to meet with policemen and to voice comments as to why they reacted the way they did to the officers, why they thought the situation took a particular turn, what they felt given what the officers did, and what was effective or ineffective about the officer's actions.

Added to the New York format of discussions between actors and officers was a video tape replay of each intervention. Replay was controlled by the trainer (Mr. Carleton Riddick) who stopped the tape and replayed selected segments so that officers, actors, and psychologist-trainers could comment on whatever occurred that could be used for learning purposes.

Video tape replay was decided upon early in the project as an effective means of training in conjunction with the simulations. There were, however, some indications of the potential worth of this technique generally from work on micro-teaching (see Gardner and Bartholomew, 1969) and specifically from a report on a small family crisis training program conducted in Redondo Beach, California by Edward

M. Glaser and Harvey L. Ross of Human Interaction Research Institute, Los Angeles.

Simulations, supplemented by actor conferences and, in particular, video tape feedback, proved, we believe, to be the most effective and stimulating aspect of the entire intensive training program.

Field Interventions and Reports

Besides the addition of video tape feedback, the Louisville project was able to make use of field interventions. These were possible because the Louisville Division of Police have the enlightened policy that qualified persons interested in seeing police work can with proper arrangements ride in patrol cars with beat officers. There is, obviously, a certain amount of risk involved in this, but whatever risk exists is certainly balanced out by the benefits of educating community leaders as to the problems of policing a major city.

Under this provision, field interventions were made by each team of police officers accompanied by a staff member. On these interventions teams were permitted to roam freely and to answer family dispute calls. Each team answered at least one and several answered two in the one evening. The following day the staff member worked with the officers who later reported on the field interventions to the entire unit. (Sample reports are included in Appendix G.)

Reports on field interventions proved valuable in two ways: they provided an opportunity for officers to convince one another that they could make effective crisis interventions in the field under actual conditions and provided a format for the training groups to be run during the operational phase of the project.

In addition to verbal reports and feedback between officers, it was arranged to have each team produce a short written report on both laboratory and field interventions, mostly for the use of other teams. Despite the policeman's distaste for writing reports, these proved useful, though not enough time was available in the present project to work with teams on their reports. Thus, it is recommended that reports be used in future programs, but that staff work with officers to develop this technique to its fullest.

Training Groups

Various considerations led to the inclusion of training groups as part of the experience provided in the five week intensive training program. Several immediate purposes can be outlined, but basically these groups were to deal with whatever matters seemed pressing at the time. They were the main source of flexibility in the program, of informal discussion, and of an opportunity to deal with feelings, uncertainties, and other personal matters. Though contact between staff and officers was encouraged,

task demands were so pressing that something less than the desired amount of informal contact actually occurred. If only to provide a basis of contact and informal interaction between trainers and officers, training groups are recommended.

Though the above statement reflects the general intent of training groups, groups differed depending upon their leader (either Dr. Meyer or Dr. Mainard), the graduate training assitant assigned to them, and the officers in the group. Two permanent training groups operated throughout the course of the intensive training program with the same six officers, graduate assistant, and group leader. As might be expected, each group performed somewhat different functions for the persons in them.

During the operational phase of the project, training groups were kept intact with the same graduate assistant and personnel save that during this phase of the project Dr. Driscoll assumed leadership of both groups. Groups met once every two weeks for the first two months of the operational phase of the project and once a month, thereafter.

The purpose of the groups during the operational phase of the project were again multifold, but the major amount of time was spent in what might best be called case conferences. Of secondary importance was work on problems involving the day-by-day functioning of the unit in the absence of the active support of immediate superiors.

Training Evaluation

The training team had formed some rather strong opinions about what aspects of the training were most valuable. Some of these are expressed above. However, it was thought useful to obtain some information as to what the officers in the project thought most valuable. Thus a questionnaire was given officers on the last day of the intensive training which asked them to rate: (a) the usefulness of presentations; (b) the usefulness of activities; and (c) the adequacy of each presentor (see Appendix C).

Anonymity was assured and as an incentive each officer was told that his ratings would be used in the design of future programs:

> Now rate the usefulness of various topics (activities) to you as a policeman. Please evaluate the topic (activity) without considering the quality of the presentor since we want to know whether to include that topic (activity) (but perhaps not the same speaker) next time.

The officer placed an X on a seven-point scale running from indispensible to unnecessary with a middle anchor of useful. All marks within the first segment were scored, one, within the second segment, two, and so on. Means of these scores were computed and are shown in Table 2-3. The ratings of presentors is of only local interest, but information on the perceived usefulness of presentations and activities would be useful to others interested in implementing similar training programs for police.

As can be seen from Table 2-3, most presentations and activities were rated as somewhat less than indispensible but somewhat more than useful. Activities generally were seen as of more utility than presentations and practical, concrete, topics as more useful than abstract ones.

If means within the first segment of the continuum are interpreted to mean indispensible, then those presentations viewed as indispensible by officers are: abnormal behavior and its management; practical rules for crisis intervention; and drugs and their effects on behavior. Indispensible activities are: simulations, meetings with actors, observations of live simulations, field inverventions, and visits to service agencies. Topics seen by the officers as only somewhat more than useful were: the orientation, a psychologists' view of the policeman's job, techniques of interviewing, and legal aspects of crisis intervention. Only one activity was seen as only somewhat more than useful: intervention reports.

Of course the above results probably relate in part to the quality of the particular presentation or activity represented in the current program; even though officers were urged to divorce their assessment from the presentor. Nonetheless, the judgments of these officers provide at least some basis for evaluating the relative usefulness of these presentations and activities. One must be careful,

however, to remember that what is reported by officers as least useful is not necessarily least useful--for instance, writing intervention reports. On the other hand, somewhat more confidence can, we think, be placed in positive reports and in deciding which aspects of the program deserve more emphasis: abnormal behavior and drugs, techniques, simulations, meetings with actors, live observations of simulations, field interventions, and visits to service agencies. Supporting these conclusions in part are responses to a request to list topics or activities they would like more of. Nearly tied for most often requested are simulations and field interventions.

Following the course evaluation, a brief commencement was held, certificates awarded (Appendix F), and field assignments made for the operational phase of the project.

Table 2-3

Comparison of Mean Usefulness Ratings by Officers of Aspects of Training Program



Field Operation and Evaluation Procedure

The types of data collected and the implements designed for that collection were dictated by decisions made regarding the strategy for evaluating the current project. Thus, a brief review of the reasons for these decisions seems warranted before proceeding to a description of the instruments.

It will be remembered from the introduction section of this paper that a preference was indicated for assessment of the project's success in terms of the effectiveness of crisis interventions made by trained officers, rather than in terms of changes in crime statistics. While crime reduction is obviously a worthy goal, the problems inherent in the use of crime statistics as indices of success make reliable assessment of crime reduction a questionable pursuit for a study of this magnitude.

One of the major problems is that, in general, crime statistics have a good deal of uncontrollable "noise" associated with them. For example, if as indicated by Wolfgang's (1958) figures, cited earlier in this paper, if something on the order of 35 percent of all homicides occur outside the context of the family or of close interpersonal relationship, the frequency with which many homicides occur is independent of influences introduced by effective family crisis intervention by police. It is the natural variation within these contrasting cases that may potentially obscure

effects of a crisis intervention training program if evaluation is based on crime statistics.

Relatedly, further uncontrolled variation in homicides of all types is introduced by a host of environmental forces over and above those generated by the program. A hot summer, economic conditions, political events, etc. may produce variations in crime statistics of a magnitude sufficient to obscure even the most optimistic effects of a training program. Such factors seem to be responsible for Bard's (1970) finding a significant increase in homicides in the precinct handled by trained men--an event which, we think, essentially validates the above arguments.

Part of the above difficulties might be circumvented by careful selection of only family assaults and homicides, where it is possible to distinguish them in police records, but another problem would still be present. Events with extremely low frequencies in the population at large, that is events which have a low a priori probability of occurrence as opposed to non-occurence, possess extreme variance relative to their expected values. Consequently, obtained differences for assaults and homicides, are likely to be insignificant statistically, even when some systematic factor generated those differences, simply because differences are buried, so to speak, in the variance of the data.

In the sense that reductions in these crime figures is a desirable goal for projects such as this, the present project also aspired to that end. However, since the

inherent complications in the use of crime statistics make direct assessment of crime reduction virtually impossible, evaluation efforts were directed to the effectiveness of the crisis interventions, themselves. To this end, a structured Telephone Interview was designed to assess various important aspects of an effective crisis intervention and used to compare the effectiveness of trained versus untrained officers.

In addition to the assessment of intervention effectiveness through the telephone interview, two other related evaluations were conducted. First, an effort was made to gauge the reactions of the participating officers to the novel intervention procedures as an occupational aid. Since major consideration in development of projects like the current one is their feasability for broader and more permanent application, it seemed wise to elicit a police officer's assessment of the utility of the skills. The degree of acceptance from participants, it was felt, would serve as an index of the reception similar training might receive from other police officers. Accordingly, the Officer Participant Questionnaire was designed to gauge the acceptance of the new crisis intervention techniques by trained officers and was administered some four months after intensive training.

Finally, it appeared that a rare opportunity was present for the collection of descriptive data on the nature of domestic conflicts and the individuals involved in them. Officers were requested, therefore, to provide standardized information after each intervention. The data accruing from these reports, it was felt, might be beneficial to the design of future related projects, and furthermore, contribute to the general body of knowledge on human conflict. These data are presented in Appendix A.

In summary, three different types of data collection implements were used to obtain evaluative information: a Crisis Intervention Report Form, a Client Telephone Questionnaire, and an Officer Participant Questionnaire. The succeeding sections of this chapter offer a detailed account of the composition and administration of these (copies of all evaluation forms can be found in Appendix D).

The Crisis Intervention Report Form

Late in July of 1970, following the completion of the five weeks of intervention training, formal operation of the 6 two-man crisis teams was initiated in the third Louisville Police district. This district extends six miles from the inner city to the outlying suburban regions of the metropolitan area and includes, according to the 1960 U. S. Census, 115,010 inhabitants (six percent of which are non-white) with a range in yearly median family income across census tracts from $2,608 to $6,488.

Two of the six teams were assigned to each of the three eight hour shifts, so that at any given time of the day there were two crisis intervention teams on duty in the district. This arrangement was maintained from late July through December of 1970 to allow for the data collection in the present evaluation. During this period, radio dispatchers, under instructions from the Chief of Police, assigned "domestic trouble" calls in the third district to trained intervention teams whenever possible. When this was not possible, the call was assigned to another patrol car in the third district manned by two untrained officers. This flexibility in assignment was necessary because all trained teams continued to handle other regular duties when not involved in crisis interventions and, thus, were often unavailable for domestic trouble calls. The resulting dispatching procedures provided an asystematic assignment of domestic cases to trained and untrained officers for subsequent evaluation follow-up in the form of the Client Telephone Questionnaire.

Over the data collection period, 421 domestic trouble runs were made in the third district by all officers, and of these runs 129 or 31 percent were made by trained officers.

The trained intervention teams were requested to complete a "Patrolman's Intervention Report Form" (which dealt mostly with demographic variables of interest) after each crisis

intervention. Unlike the New York project, untrained officers were never required to complete intervention forms. To have made such a request in view of the burden of paper work already encountered disdainfully by police officers, would have been to ask for increased output without their personal committment to the project. However, eighty-nine crisis report forms were submitted by the officers over the evaluation period. These 89 reports represent 70 percent of the 129 cases handled by the trained officers during the evaluation period; which is a reasonable rate considering that some calls dispatched as family trouble were probably inappropriately classified by dispatchers. Whatever the reasons for the 70 percent completion rate, there was nothing to indicate a bias on the part of the officers in reporting cases. The officers were unaware of the telephone follow-up of cases and to them the reports ostensibly were requested only for the descriptive information. On this basis, it was felt that the sample of cases obtained is a reasonably unprejudiced representation of domestic crisis cases in the third district.

The Client Telephone Questionnaire

The core of the evaluation was constituted by a structured telephone interview administered to clients of interventions for the purpose of comparing the effectiveness of trained and untrained officers. These interviews were

conducted without the knowledge of either trained or untrained officers.

Six evaluative questions were included on the questionnaire and all questions were constructed in relatively simplistic language, as were the accompanying response choices. While this may have restricted the depth and complexity of the questions posed, it was nonetheless deemed necessary to communicate on an elementary level because of the possible range in educational backgrounds of the clients.

Four of the six evaluative questions were intended to examine the several aspects of tension reduction or emotional de-escalation in the immediate crisis. Briefly, these four questions concerned: the clients' impressions of the rapport of the officers, the clients' impressions of the concern of the officers, any alteration in his opinion of police as a result of the visit, and finally, his overall satisfaction with the intervention. Each item allowed the interviewee to respond with one of three alternatives varying from a positive response to a negative response with a somewhat neutral response interposed.

The other two evaluative questions dealt with the extent to which the crisis precipitating problem was mitigated or resolved by the intervening officers. One of these simply asked the client how helpful the officer had been

with the problem. A second question approached the same issue indirectly by asking the client if the likelihood of his calling the police back for a similar problem had changed as a result of the latest police visit. As with the other four questions, the individual was allowed three alternative responses for each of the two items. The alternatives for the former were expressions of varying degrees of helpfulness. The latter offered the client the possibility of responding that he was "more likely," "less likely" or about "as likely" to call the police back under similar circumstances.

In addition to these questions, which were intended for evaluation based upon a trained-untrained comparison, several other questions were included on the questionnaire for various other purposes. Two questions were posed on the experimental police referral system by which officers directed individuals with chronic problems to appropriate local agencies; one as to whether a referral was made, and a second on whether the agency was visited. Neither, of course, was asked clients of trained officers, inasmuch as these officers were not making referrals at that time. Finally, the clients were queried as to whether the police had made a previous visit for a similar problem. The intent of this item was to give some measure of the comparability of the trained and untrained samples with regard to previous contact with the police under similar conditions.

The procedures for locating the telephone numbers of clients of trained and untrained officers for administration of the client questionnaire were somewhat different; names and addresses of trained police clients were provided by the previously described Patrolmens Intervention Report Form, completed by the trained officers. Upon receipt of the report form, a Louisville telephone directory was consulted for the telephone number of the household. If this yielded no number, a criss-cross telephone directory, which lists telephone numbers by address location, was then consulted.

Since no crisis report forms were completed by untrained officers, it was necessary to scan police records of the third district each week for the preceding seven days. A list of the addresses of these calls as well as the date, time of day and patrol car dispatched was made. Unfortunately, no names were available on these cards because dispatchers are not required to report the names of people involved. After compilation of the list, the addresses were checked against the addresses of trained officer reports, and matching addresses were eliminated from the untrained officer case list. Addresses on the revised list were then checked for telephone numbers in the criss-cross directory without initial reference to the regular Louisville telephone directory, since the latter directory lists by name.

The telephone contact procedures for both groups were essentially equivalent. For any given number on either list, four contact attempts (a contact attempt is defined as an open line ring) were made over the two day period succeeding number procurement by alternating day and evening attempts. When no adult of the given household was contacted in the four attempts, the telephone number was discarded and attempts to contact the household were discontinued.

All interviews were conducted by either Mr. Schanie or a female assistant. A procedure of interviewing the first adult of the household of either sex arriving at the phone was adopted over an equal sex sampling procedure. One major reason for this was an attempt to avoid the possibility of creating further domestic conflict over an unidentified male caller asking for the wife or an unidentified female caller asking for the husband. Contact of an adult and identification of the household as the current target household was succeeded in both groups by the following introduction:

> I'm calling as an assistant of the Louisville Police Department. We have just begun a new training program for our officers to teach them to better help the people to whose homes they are called. We are trying now to see just how this new program is working. We consider your opinions the most important tools we have for looking at the value of this new training. We understand that two of our officers visited your home the other day and we wondered if you would answer a few questions for us about them. The answers you give us will never be seen by anyone

other than our study team and are entirely confidential. We would, therefore, like you to answer our questions exactly as you feel. Will you cooperate with us?

It might be noted here, that three people in the untrained group and one in the trained group at this point of the interview admitted that the police had been to their home but refused to talk to the interviewer. These cases were not included, of course, since no responses to the questions were obtained. After elimination of these cases the final numbers of completed interviews in the untrained and trained groups were 26 and 29, respectively.

The male interviewer made 46% of the contacts for the untrained group and 58% of the contacts in the trained group. Statistical tests within groups, however, showed no differences between the distributions of responses made to the male compared to the female interviewer.

One question which might be reasonably posed with regard to the two samples is the extent to which the assystematic, but not random, sampling procedure with the necessity of telephone contact imposed upon it produced like samples for the two groups. The best single indicator of similarity available appeared to be the average family incomes of the census tracts into which the households of both groups fell. Accordingly, all households were categorized by census tract, and average family incomes for all involved tracts were determined from the United States Census of 1960. The

median, mode and mean of these incomes were then computed for each group. Median and mode for both samples were exactly equal, obtaining a value of $7,052. The mean for the untrained group was $6,689 while that for the trained group was $6,625 or $64.00 less.

Still another indicator of sample similarity was available; the distribution of responses obtained on the telephone interviews to the question of whether the police had been to the home before under similar circumstances. For the trained group the frequency of responding "yes" to this item was 12, while the "no" response occurred 17 times. The distribution of responses in the untrained group was divided equally between the two responses, both obtaining thirteen. A chi square analysis yielded an X^2 of .411 which for 1 d.F. possessed a probability of greater than .50 of occurring by chance alone. This finding in conjunction with the above measures of income seemed to provide good assurance of the comparability of samples.

The Officer Participant Questionnaire

In order to fully assess the impact of the training program it was deemed necessary to examine the effects of the new skills from the perspective of those utilizing them. Accordingly, the Officer Participant Questionnaire was designed.

Five items on this questionnaire concerned the officer's perception of the amount of change in the effectiveness with which he handled domestic trouble calls following training as compared to before training. Each question assumed the form of a seven-point bi-polar scale on which the officers were requested to indicate the amount of change in effectiveness (positive or negative) they experienced as a result of the application of intervention techniques. Specifically, these five questions asked for judgments regarding increases or decreases in: understanding of the problems encountered; acceptance of their intrusion into domestic situations; receptivity of clients to suggestions; necessity for force; and overall effectiveness in handling family crises.

The issue of participant acceptance of the program was examined via four items. One of these items took the form of the type of recommendation an officer would give another policeman concerning entrance into crisis intervention training. This rating was made on a scale similar to those described above. Three open-ended sections provided the balance of information on participant acceptance, one asking for the disadvantages of their participation, and a second asking about the advantages of participation A general comments section was provided to allow expression of additional relevant opinions.

The twelve participants were mailed the Training Participant Questionnaire four months after the beginning of formal operation of the crisis intervention units. The following instructions and explanation to the officers prefaced each questionnaire.

> The following questionnaire was drawn up to give us a better picture of the effects of crisis intervention training. Specifically, we want to know what the training has or has not meant to you in performing the duties of a police officer in crisis interventions.
>
> Completion of the questionnaire should require only a few minutes. It will be appreciated if you complete this questionnaire on the day it is received and mail it back the next day in the return envelope provided within. Please do not sign your name, we want you to feel totally free in expressing yourself.

Eight of the 12 questionnaires were returned by mail within two days of their initial dispatch. The other four questionnaires were not received in the four days succeeding their mailing to the officers. It was, thus, necessary to make a second mailing to all twelve individuals (because of the anonymity of the questionnaire) with an explanation of the circumstances. This second mailing produced the four withstanding questionnaires.

Results

Results are presented as a combination of items from both the Officer Participant Questionnaire and the Client Telephone Questionnaire where these items bear on the same issue. Three issues are addressed in this manner: effective resolution of the immediate crisis, resolution of the problem underlying the crisis, and finally, officer participant evaluation of the new methods.

Effective Crisis Resolution

Emotional de-escalation of the immediate crisis is, of course, important to the prevention of physical harm to the disputants in the immediate crisis. Traditional methods dictated that police officers discourage violence on the part of the disputants by whatever means deemed necessary, including arrest, force, or the threat of these. Unfortunately, force or the threat of force are all too often inappropriately employed, and their consequences are frequently counterproductive in the sense that already frustrated individuals are antagonized even more. Surpression of the conflict all too often results in repressed hostility that is likely to re-emerge on the officers' departure, or upon their return.

Project trained officers were expected to arrive at a successful emotional de-escalation, as opposed to a suppression of aggressive tendencies, by way of behavior

management techniques, used as alternatives to force, whenever possible. Instrumental to this goal, according to the dictates of crisis intervention theory, is an understanding of the clients themselves and their problems. Without some basic understanding of their clients, officers are unlikely to assume the posture of a behavioral engineer; a posture necessary for the benevolent manipulation of their clients. Thus, an increased understanding of the conflict might be taken as one index of the ability to execute an effective intervention.

Figure 4-1 (Figures appear at the end of this section) shows the distribution of officers' ratings of the change in understanding of domestic conflicts after four months in the field following training. If values +3 and -3 are assigned to the most positive and most negative points of the 7 point scale, respectively, a mean rating of 2.73 is obtained, clearly indicating that the officers as a group felt they had a better understanding of conflict situation four months after training as opposed to before training.

In lieu of explicit or implicit intimidation as a form of behavioral control, the officers were expected to establish a positive relationship with the clients that would favorably alter the emotional atmosphere of the crisis and allow for a problem solving rapport with the clients. Figure 4-2 shows the percentage distributions of responses

welcome as a result of his application of novel intervention procedures and that only one experienced no positive change in perceived welcomeness. Assigning values of +3 (much more welcome) through -3 (much less welcome) to extremes of the seven points of the rating scale, a mean response of +2.0 was obtained. While it is impossible to attribute anything like statistical "significance" to the results, the fact that the average respondent was so positive is relatively convincing that officers perceived clients as more accepting of them following training compared to before training.

Taken together, the results on these two items suggest that the intervention skills of trained officers were successful in generating an atmosphere in the crisis context which was more conducive to approaching non-aggressive solutions to domestic conflict.

Following the establishment of rapport, the officers' task was one of directing their clients toward viable solutions of the problems initiating the crisis. Of paramount importance here was the officers display of concern over the peoples' problems and their perceptions of a sincere effort on the part of the officers to help them work toward a solution. In the absence of such a problem-solving set established by the officers it is improbable that most disputants would spontaneously develop the rational posture

that is necessary to constructing solutions to interpersonal problems. The percentage histogram shown in Figure 4-4 contrasts the differences in client perceptions of trained and untrained officers with regard to the officers' concern. As can be seen, the trained distribution shows a preponderance of the most favorable responses as compared to the more even distribution of the untrained group. A chi square analysis performed on the frequencies shown below figure 4-4 (after collapsing categories "C" and "B" because of insufficient expected frequency in the former,) yields a X^2 value of 4.185 (1 d.F., $p<.05$). It would thus seem that the trained officers were perceived by their clients as exhibiting a significantly greater effort to help with their problems.

It was expected, though by no means absolutely predicted, that the officers' concern for people and their problems would translate into greater client acceptance of their efforts to help them. Figure 4-5 shows the distribution of ratings obtained from the officers concerning changes in client receptivity. It will be noted that the responses lie primarily about the "much more receptive" end of the scale. Employing the same scale values as used earlier (+3 to -3), a mean response of +2.0 is obtained, indicating a substantial shift in the officers' experience of client receptivity relative to pre-training interventions.

The complementary perspective to client receptivity is the issue of use of force in the crisis situation, the importance of which has already been noted. If clients are judged as more recpetive, it might reasonably be expected that force had become less necessary for controlling the disputants. The results of the officers' ratings of change in necessity for force is shown in Figure 4-6 and confirm this notion. The mean of the ratings (based on the now familiar assignment of values) is +1.92, indicating that officers perceived that less force was required after training compared to before training.

On the basis of the preceding results on officer commitment to rendering aid, client receptivity, and implementation of force, it would appear that the officers were successful in controlling most crises with benevolent behavior management techniques.

Since it was unfeasible to label and assess all the many aspects of a "good" intervention according to the prescriptions of crisis intervention theory, some reliance had to be placed upon global indices of the overall adequacy of the officers' interventions. First, the officers themselves were requested to rate any change in simple "effectiveness" in domestic interventions they felt had occurred as result of their new skills. Figure 4-7 presents the distribution of responses along the scale. The

most striking feature of the distribution is that nine officers gave +3 ratings (maximum) of change in effectiveness. The mean of the distribution is +2.67. The results on this scale leave little doubt that officers themselves felt substantially more effective in the crisis situation.

Framing a question for clients, congruent in purpose to examining overall effectiveness of the crisis resolution, was not as straight-forward as with the officers. Obviously, a question dealing directly with effectiveness of crisis resolution would leave at least some of the clients unacceptably uncertain with respect to what constituted "effectiveness." Accordingly, a more general question was posed in the form of client satisfaction, that is, whether they were pleased with the way the police officers handled the situation Such an approach has a good deal of validity if one accepts the premise that the police officers would not countenance violence in the intervention and that success, thus, becomes largely a matter of manipulating clients in a manner which is non-inflammatory. The histograms in Figure 4-8, which display the percentage distribution of responses for clients of trained and untrained officers, indicate a greater overall client satisfaction with trained officers as opposed to untrained officers. An almost overwhelming majority of the clients of trained officers gave the most favorable response, while only about a third of the clients of untrained

officers did so. The frequency with which each response occurred for both groups can be found below the figure and when the frequencies for responses "B" and "C" are combined because of the low expected frequency in the latter, a chi square on the frequencies resulted in a value of 9.5 (1 d.f., $p<.01$). This result supports the strong implication of the histograms that clients of the trained officers were significantly more satisfied with the police interventions than the clients of untrained officers.

Finally, it was supposed that if the socio-emotional effects of the novel procedures were profound enough, clients might positively alter their opinions of police officers. Figure 4-9 shows, once again, the responses of the two groups of clients to the question of opinion change irrespective of direction. Ten of the 29 clients in the trained group changed their opinion of the police, while only one of the 26 in the untrained group changed his opinion. A chi square performed on the frequency distributions shown below this figure resulted in a value of 6.241 which is significant beyond the .02 level for 1 d.f. This result, of course, shows that clients of trained officers changed their opinion of the police significantly more often than clients of untrained officers.

A follow-up question, which can be found on the questionnaire itself in Appendix C, determined that the one individual

handled by untrained officers showing a change, changed toward a more positive opinion of the police. Nine of the ten persons handled by trained officers changed toward a more positive opinion of the police. The frequencies on this follow-up question are too small for reliable statistical analysis and projection of this effect on a larger scale. However, in the present project, of the citizens contacted in the telephone survey, 31 percent handled by trained officers reported a favorable opinion change. Untrained officers were reported to induce a favorable opinion change in a notably smaller percentage (4 percent) of their cases.

It would thus appear that the novel intervention procedure was not only accepted by clients, but appears to have had positive effects dramatic enough to favorably alter the opinions of a substantial proportion of the clients toward the police.

Problem Resolution

It was hoped that, as a result of their new intervention procedures, the trained officers might not only be more effective in de-escalating the immediate crisis but might also be more successful in the resolution of long-standing interpersonal conflict. In view of the fact that project officers had at their dispcsal psychological skills, knowledge about referral to various social agencies, as

well as a basic orientation toward problem resolution in the domestic context, it seemed reasonable to consider that trained officers might meet with some success in dealing with longstanding marital discord. Unfortunately, the expectation appears to have been mainly unfulfilled.

Figure 4-10 shows the percentage distributions of responses obtained from clients of trained and untrained officers to a question on the degree to which the officers were actually able to settle personal problems. It will be noted that 62 percent of the clients of trained officers responded that the intervening officers were very helpful, while fifty percent of the clients of untrained officers responded in a like manner. Another feature worthy of note is that a greater percentage of clients in the trained group as opposed to clients in the untrained group (17 percent v.s. 12 percent) responded that the officers were not helpful at all. But these apparent differences are not established as reliable by statistical analysis. A chi square performed on the frequencies shown below the figure (after collapsing response categories "B" and "C" because of the insufficient expected frequency in the latter) yielded a value of .813; indicating that even though the differences in the distributions were in a direction favorable to trained officers, trained officers were reported by clients to be successful in longstanding problem solution no more frequently than untrained officers.

As a further, though even more indirect assessment of the efficacy of the two groups in rendering aid to problems, clients were asked about their readiness to call the police back in the event of other future problems. The assumption here was that adequate problem solution should increase the clients' willingness to request police service again in the event of need and that if officers were given more immediate access a gain would have been made in violence prevention. Once again, as is immediately apparent in Figure 4-11 which shows the two percentage distributions, the differences are neglible. A chi square analysis performed on the frequencies shown below figure 11 (after combining frequencies for "B" and "C" because the expected frequency of response "C" for the untrained group is not sufficiently large) produced a value of .02 (1 d.f., n.s.). Clients of trained officers voiced no greater likelihood than clients of untrained officers of calling the police back for a similar problem.

Finally, some attempt was made to gauge the success of the social agency referral system that trained police began employing along with their new intervention procedures. It was hoped that a substantial number of clients, who were referred to agencies for services beyond the scope of the officers' skills and duties, would accept these referrals and visit the agencies shortly after they were

made. There was no comparative information on this item, inasmuch as untrained officers were not formally making referrals at the time, and the results for the trained group must, therefore, be interpreted independently. Of the 29 cases in which clients were contacted, 21 individuals reported that a referral was made. When questioned further, only three clients reported that they had gone for help to the agency to which they were referred. The results are clear; for most referrals made by trained officers clients failed to take advantage of the available services brought to their attention. Nonetheless any rate above the zero rate of the untrained group is a gain.

Participant Acceptance

A major concern of any project introducing new skills to individuals who already have extensive experience with the subject matter must be the acceptance of those individuals employing those new skills. This derives from the fact that no matter how worthwhile those skills seem by other standards, they must be endorsed by the participants if they are ever to be implemented on any large scale. With this in mind, the participating officers were requested to indicate on a seven point bi-polar scale the nature of the recommendation they would make to a fellow officer concerning participation in a similar program. The resulting frequency distribution is shown in Figure 4-12. Eleven of

the 12 participants indicated that they would "strongly encourage" participation for a fellow officer. The results are so strong that they go beyond mere acceptance of the program to an actual strong endorsement of it in the very practical terms of recommending it to a colleague.

But even this overwhelmingly positive response does not do justice to the reception of the program. Included on the Training Participant Questionnaire were three "open" questions, allowing the officers to express any "advantages," "disadvantages," or "general comments" related to participation in the project. It speaks well of the program that only one officer expressed any disadvantage of participation in the project, saying that the time involved in resolving disputes could be used in regular patrol. The statements in the "advantages" and "general comments" section are, however, even more reassuring. Eleven of the 12 participants stated specific advantages of participation in the program, and a like number made positive "general comments," with one individual leaving the latter section entirely blank. It should be noted that all of the negative expressions received in the "general comments" section were addressed to administrative problems (e.g. dispatching of radio calls, support of field commanding officers) and not to the project per se or the intervention skills. Presentation of the total set of responses

to these two sections is impossible, but a brief combined summary of the two sections seems in order.

One of the most frequent themes in these open sections was a new sense of adequacy in behavior management. Five of the officers expressed greater confidence in handling family crises, with two of the five officers extending it to include all interpersonal dealings as a police officer. One officer noted that "the touchy aspect of a situation is now alleviated moments after our arrival." Another stated that he now had a feeling of "being in control of any situation."

Yet another theme, and perhaps one that is allied to the one above, is a basic appreciation of the determinants of human behavior. A better understanding of others was given as one advantage of program participation by 6 of the 12 participants. Typical of these comments was one which related that crisis intervention training "gives the officer a better understanding of the family problem and a much better way to cope with it." Five officers expressed satisfaction with their enhanced ability to help people find solutions to domestic problems.

Most reassuring of all the results received in the open sections was the spontaneously expressed desire of 8 of the 12 participants to see the program extended to include more if not all Louisville police officers.

These are not by any means all of the comments received, but, limited as they are they still indicate that all participants experienced some profit from their training and most experienced a good deal.



Figure 4-1. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: How much better or worse do you feel you understand the nature of family crises as a result of your training.



Figure 4-2. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: How friendly would you say the officers were? Would you say that:

A. they were friendly like a stranger on the street.
B. they were friendly like a neighbor.
C. they were friendly like a big brother or sister.



Figure 4-3. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: How much more or less welcome do you feel in homes of disputants as a result of your training.



Figure 4-4. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: How hard do you think the officers tried to help with the problem that brought them? Would you say that:

A. they tried very hard to help.
B. they tried a little to help, but not much.
C. they didn't try to help at all.



Figure 4-5. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: How much more or less receptive do the disputants seem to be to what you have to say in family crisis interventions as a result of your training.



Figure 4-6. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: How much more or less force have you found necessary in handling family crises as a result of your training.



Figure 4-7. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: How much more or less effective do you feel you are in handling family crises as a result of your training.



Figure 4-8. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: How happy were you with the way the policemen handled the situation? Would you say that:

A. you were very happy with the way they handled the situation.
B. you think they handled it okay.
C. you were unhappy with the way they handled it.



Figure 4-9. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: Did the way these police officers acted in your home change your opinion of the police?



Figure 4-10. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: How helpful would you say the officers were in settling your problem? Would you say that:

A. they were very helpful.
B. they were a little helpful, but not much.
C. they were not helpful at all.



Figure 4-11. Percentage distribution of clients' responses to the question: Now that the Police have visited would you be more or less likely to call them back if you needed them? Would you be:

A. more likely to call them.
B. less likely to call them.
C. about as likely as before.



Figure 4-12. Distribution of officers' responses to the question: What type of recommendation would you give a fellow officer if he asked for your opinion concerning whether or not he should participate in a crisis intervention training program of this sort.

Discussion

Singly, the Client Telephone Questionnaire or the Officer Participant Questionnaire would have provided rather tenuous support for crisis intervention training of police officers. However, together the two questionnaires compliment one another and one supports the other in such a way that a degree of confidence can be reasonably placed in their jointly-indicated results that would not be warranted looking at either one singly. Similarly, questionnaire data are susceptible to a host of methodological problems. But so are most sources of field data (even crime statistics as was indicated earlier) and each technique has its own idiosyncratic set of deficiencies. However, few deficiencies are shared and this permits the present questionnaire data to be combined with the crime statistic data of the New York project, with much more confidence being placed in jointly-supported conclusions than would be in results based on one or the other evaluation in isolation. Since it is the integration of findings from the two questionnaires of the present study which provides the best internal evaluation of the usefulness of crisis intervention training for police, the first part of this discussion will be devoted to conclusions based on their joint results. In the second part of th

discussion, an attempt will be made to integrate the findings of the Louisville project with the findings of the New York project since the most trustworthy evaluation of police crisis intervention is probably available as a function of the complementarity of the questionnaire-based findings of the Louisville project and the crime statistic-based findings of the New York project.

Thus, the first question that might be asked is: What general conclusions seem warranted by the findings of both questionnaires in the Louisville project. One general conclusion that seems warranted is that trained police conducted more effective interventions in terms of reducing conflict in the immediate crisis than did untrained police. The Officer Participant Questionnaire showed strong effects in the direction of improved understanding of interpersonal conflict, enhanced acceptance of officers by clients, greater receptivity to suggestions, less need of force, and increased overall effectiveness. The Client Telephone Questionnaire showed statistically significant effects in favor of trained officers in rapport with clients, perceived interest in the problem with accompanying efforts to help, overall satisfaction with the intervention, and attitude toward the police.

Any one specific effect listed here might easily be questioned, but the consensus that is apparent between

officers and clients on the many dimensions involved in dealing with the crisis leaves little room for argument against the conclusion that trained officers conducted superior crisis interventions, compared to untrained officers.

Though not too much should be made of specific effects those which have greatest significance for police officers seem worth mentioning. Two of these, in particular, recommend the project to police departments. These are, the reported decrease of force required in interventions and the change in attitudes toward policemen which results from effective crisis intervention. Alternatives to the use of force are desirable generally, but within the area of domestic strife the application of techniques substitutable for force probably reduce the policeman's chances of physical injury--an outcome of unquestionable value and one supportive of Bard's (1970) results as will be discussed later. Favorable changes in attitudes are particularly important, currently, given problems with the policeman's image characteristic of most contemporary American cities. Thus, any program showing saltatory changes in attitudes toward police officers serves a very real need on the contemporary scene. We think it not purely coincidental that changes in attitudes towards police resulted from their efficient handling of interpersonal problems.

Bittner (1970, Chap. 6), for example, points out that it is mostly in such helping areas that recognition and status can be earned, and the present finding at least indirectly corraborates this assertion. These findings listed above recommend crisis intervention training to police administrators but perhaps the most persuasive recommendation for such a project to officers, themselves, comes anonymously from FCIU officers, who four months into the operational phase of the project, strongly recommended the training for their colleagues. (Favorable publicity on the project can be found in Appendix H.)

A second conclusion that might seem possible is with regard to the problem-resolution effectiveness of trained officers. Apparently, effective crisis interventions do not assure that long-term problems will be resolved, as suggested by results of the Client Telephone Questionnaire. Two questions (one asking if officers helped with the problem, the other asking if they were more likely to recall the police) showed no differences between trained and untrained groups of officers. These findings suggest that long-range outcomes of effective interventions did not occur, though no strong conclusion is possible since complimentary questions were not included in the Officer Participant Questionnaire, and these findings rest only with the Client Telephone Questionnaire.

The failure to find long-range effects following effective interventions could have resulted in two ways: One, effects were, indeed, non-existant, and two, the rate of success in such cases is so marginal that present techniques failed to detect them. It would not be too surprising to find the first possibility true; that trained officers were unable to resolve long-standing problems in the short time permitted on each case since the problems are notoriously intransigent. It is, however, equally possible that some advantage in favor of trained officers does exist but that rates of success are so low so as to require a sample markedly larger than the present one to establish these slight differences as real. Unfortunately, evidence internal to the Louisville project does not permit a judgment to be made on this issue. However, the evaluation of the New York project was directly focused on outcomes such as call-backs and it is in such instances that the complementarity of the different evaluation techniques can be brought into play.

It is necessary, though, to first review the findings of the New York project. The New York project focused on six evaluative criteria with expectations for each as to the direction of change. These expectations were:

(a) that the number of family disturbance complaints would decrease in the demonstration precinct, compared to

the control precinct. Evaluation showed three times more complaints in the demonstration precinct as in the control precinct--a finding opposite to expectations.

(b) that the number of repeat interventions for trained officers would decrease (as a function of problem resolution) compared to the number for control officers. Actually the FCIU recorded significantly more repeat cases than officers in the control precinct--again the findings were opposite expectation.

(c) that homicides would be reduced in the demonstration precinct compared to the control. Surprisingly, "Total homicides increased considerable (three and one-half times) in the demonstration precinct, while there was a one-third reduction in homicides in the comparison precinct" (Bard, 1970, p. 27).

(d) that homicides among family members would decrease in the demonstration precinct, compared to the control precinct. Here, too, homicides increased in the demonstration precinct but remained constant in the control precinct.

(e) that assaults would decrease in the demonstration precinct compared to the control precinct. Fewer assaults were found in the demonstration precinct compared to the control precinct. This is, of course, consistent with expectations.

(f) that injuries to policemen would be reduced in the demonstration precinct, compared to the control precinct. No FCIU officer was injured despite the greater probability that they would be considering the greater number of domestic calls they made. However, two members of the regular force in the demonstration precinct and one officer in the control precinct sustained injuries in family disputes.

On the surface several of the above results of the New York project might elicit alarm. Had the number of family disturbance calls been fewer, had assaults and homicides decreased in the demonstration precinct, the logic of the experimental design would have permitted the conclusion that the project was responsible for these positive effects. Similarly, in that family disturbance calls increased, and assaults and homicides were greater in the demonstration precinct than in the control, it is equally valid to conclude that the project was responsible for these negative effects. The only recourse to this conclusion is to propose the existence of confounding events extraneous to the experimental design and, admittedly, the presence of such events is plausible. Bard (1970) argues that differences in reporting between FCIU officers and untrained control officers accounts for the differences found in the number of disturbance complaints and the number

of repeat interventions. This is an acceptable explanation knowing the aversion of most police officers to completing written reports.

Another explanation offered by Bard (1970) is that ". . .the availability of a more effective police service in this connection may have resulted in greater and more effective community utilization of the FCIU." Several results from the Louisville project add plausibility to this suggestion as a partial explanation for the greater number of FCIU initial and repeat calls in the New York project. Officers' reports that they were more welcome and that clients were more receptive of them and their suggestions as well as reports from citizens that they thought more of trained officers, all would lead one to expect that citizens would utilize their police more in crisis circumstances. However, the "call back" question on the Client Telephone Questionnaire failed to support the argument that citizens would more readily recall police. The weight of the evidence, however, appears to be in favor of greater utilization of police since this occurred as an outcome in the New York project and the basic processes thought to be responsible for this outcome (welcomness, receptivity, favorable attitude) were demonstrated to exist in the Louisville project.

It is somewhat more difficult to explain the increases in assaults and homicides found in the New York project, and Bard's (1970) conclusion that ". . .the operation of the FCIU failed to effect any change in overall homicide incidence in the demonstration area" (p. 2") is patently erroneous given the logic of the design of the evaluation. Within the logic of the evaluation design an increase in homicides must be considered as a probable effect of the experimental treatment--crisis intervention training for policemen. Furthermore, in the case of assaults and homicide statistics, differential reporting cannot be employed as a plausible external confounding factor since assault and homicide statistics were collected independent of the project in the usual manner of the New York City Police Department. Thus, either the effects must be accepted as due to the project or a reasonable argument must be made that it is extremely unlikely that such effects would emerge from the project and that other extraneous factors were responsible for them.

One very plausible extraneous consideration is that the New York project was run during the summer of 1967--a time of notable Black unrest. Thus, the increase in homicides may have been a reflection of heightened tensions in the Black community. The difference between the demonstration and the control precinct, then, might be more a

function of the unfortunate fact that the demonstration precinct was almost totally Negro and the control precinct largely Puerto Rican. There is no evidence to suppot this argument, however, it must simply stand on its appeal to reason.

There is evidence, however, from the Louisville project supportive of the claim that it is unlikely that increases in assaults and homicides would eventuate from police application of crisis intervention techniques in domestic trouble situations. On the one hand, if trained policeman were inadvertently exacerbating domestic conflict, negative consequences might be understood. On the other hand, if trained policemen are responded to positively by citizens, it is unlikely that they are contributing to conflict and unlikely that their activities result in increases in violence. Thus, results from the Louisville project's evaluation showing effects such as increased friendliness, satisfaction, and appreciation of the officers, support the argument that whatever the cause of the increased incidence of assaults and homicides in the New York project, it is unlikely that FCIU officers contributed to conflict and violence through their crisis interventions. Interventions which produce high levels of positive socio-emotional reaction are unlikely to leave a residual for violence.

Additionally, the New York and Louisville projects compliment one another in terms of violence reduction. In the New York project, no FCIU officer was injured while three untrained patrolmen in the area were injured on domestic trouble calls. These frequencies are too small for statistical tests so external support is desirable. Such support seems to be provided by the officers' reports in the Louisville project that they required less force in handling domestic conflicts following training than before. Thus, one benefit of crisis intervention training appears to be that it provides officers alternatives to violence which in turn reduces their own liability of injury.

As was mentioned earlier, the evaluation of the Louisville project, since it is directed more at process than outcome, is insufficient to establish that any long-range effects were forthcoming. The two bits of evidence on this issue (questions on helping with the problem and on willingness to call the police again) failed to support the hypothesis that differences in favor of trained officers would exist. Data on the number of referrals were too few to give a persuasive endorsement to the project in terms of bringing long-term help to citizens in need. On the other hand, the outcome-directed evaluation of the New York project offers sufficient evidence that family crisis intervention training for police can have long-term effects.

First, if the New York finding that FCIU officers made more initial and repeat calls is interpreted in the light of findings from the Louisville project to mean that they were in greater demand by citizens, it seems that the program enhances the police function in a community. Police presence in potentially dangerous situations is obviously desirable as a long-term goal. Not only can police counter violence by their presence but may offer more extensive aid. Indeed that such aid was rendered, at least periodically, is attested to a number of successful referrals. Of 719 families referred to a social agency in New York it could be verified that 69 (9.6%) took advantage of the referral and contacted the agency. Of the 21 referrals made by FCIU officers in the Louisville project, three (7%) persons reported that they went to the agency. Though this rate is quite low in both instances, it is obvious that some persons received help who would otherwise have remained unaided.

Finally, the New York and Louisville projects differred in several general qualitative ways which serve as sources of information on several considerations related to future applications. The first consideration is relevant to most methods, techniques, and programs designed and applied by one man or a cohesive group of men: Is the technique, method, or program transferrable; can other men apply the

same procedures and expect comparable outcomes. The success of the Louisville project, modeled after the New York project, argues persuasively that crisis intervention training for police can be generally applied. Indeed the program appears to be very robust insofar as it can tolerate a number of deviations from the initial plan. Some deviations made successfully in the Louisville project are instructive:

(a) police personnel in the New York project were highly selected, whereas in the Louisville project little selection was possible. Given the success of the Louisville project, it follows that select police officers are not a prerequisite and that the program might be applied to whole departments without major revision based on the qualities of the police personnel.

(b) the theoretical point of view of the New York project was generally analytic compared to the more behaviorally oriented philosophy of the Louisville staff. At the least, such differences in theoretical orientation seem not crucial to the success of the project. The project seems quite robust with respect to the theoretical proclivities of the trainers.

(3) the target population in the New York project was almost exclusively Negro while in the Louisville project the target population was over 90% white. These differences,

too, seem unimportant save for requiring a few special presentations on peculiar aspects of the target population.

Many other differences can probably be tolerated in any new application of crisis intervention training for police. However, some problems encountered in the present project point to a few areas where laxness may seriously restrict the effectiveness of the program. One of these areas is the support of immediate superiors. Support for the Louisville program came from the top command of the Police Department and the officers in the program soon became advocates of crisis training. However, command personnel at the level of sergant, lieutenant, and captain proved indifferent, at best, and hostile, at worse. The FCIU officers were subject to ridicule at times from untrained officers which was particularly harsh in the absence of active support from immediate superiors. Bard (1970) avoided many of these problems by a program of conferences with all personnel to be indirectly involved with the project. This procedure is strongly recommended. However, even more strongly recommended is a procedure wherein an autonomous subsystem is selected and everyone within that subsystem (say, a precinct) submitted to the training program. This, in effect, isolates the trained personnel from counter influences from the larger organization.

Another shortcoming shared by both the New York and Louisville project was the inadequacy of the service agency laisson. In both projects, for instance, agencies proved indifferent to the extent that agency referrals could not be traced. This is a particularly insidious problem since surface cooperation is often easily obtained from colleagues working in agencies. However, the day-to-day demands upon staff in these agencies seems so pressing that they invariably neglect their participation in the project. Closer liaison with social agencies is one answer, but an established Crisis Center with an adequate referral and follow-up service is strongly recommended.

Given the precautions stated above, there appears to be every reasonable assurance that the Bard model of crisis intervention training for policemen can be applied with success in a wide range of settings by professionals of a variety of orientations and that highly desirable outcomes will ensue.

APPENDIX A

Descriptive Data from Family Crisis Report

During the operational phase of the project, there were 421 domestic trouble runs made in the third district and of these, 129 were made by FCIU officers. Of the 129 runs made, Family Crisis Reports were submitted on 89 runs, which involved some 206 persons. The data reported here is a compilation of the information from these reports as completed by trained officers.

When

As any experienced police officer knows, family trouble calls vary widely according to month of year, week, and day. Smmilarly, criminologists, aware of such variations, have used them in order to infer the dynamics of violent behavior. For example, Lunden (1967) uses the temporal variation in crimes against persons to make the following inference:

> Since the number of crimes vary according to the degree and the intensity of social interaction among people it is normal to expect fluctuations of offenses by days of week. . . .Regardless of areas, as long as people follow the 7-day cycle of little or no work from Friday through Sunday, crimes are always higher during this period (p. 32).

Accordingly, the following temporal data are presented.

Figure 5-1 (figures and tables appear at the end of this section) shows the number of Family Crisis Reports

submitted by FCIU officers as a function of months during the operational phase of the project. For comparison, the frequency of all family runs in the third district by month are shown. As can be seen, both functions begin high in July and diminish steadily. FCIU reported cases remained at roughly a constant proportion of all 3rd district cases.[1] Both sets of data convey the general impression that during the months of July through November, domestic crises calls decline steadily. This decline resulted in about half as many runs being made in November as in August. The trends shown are quite consistent with trends for crimes against persons, generally. For example, the function for aggravated assault shown by Lunden (1967, p. 29) increases from January to August then decreases steadily to the January low. The decrease in domestic trouble runs in Louisville corresponds temporally to the period of decreasing incidence for assaults. Thus, it can be seen that the data show the decline from August to November characteristic of crimes against the person, generally.

Next, consider the equally sizable fluctuations which occur in domestic trouble runs as they vary with day of the week. As Figure 5-2 shows, family trouble calls vary at least by a factor of two over days of the week. Peaks in Louisville's 3rd police district are Wednesday and

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[1]The July estimate for FCIU is the frequency of reports for the week they were in the field multiplied by the number of weeks in July.

Sunday with Tuesday and Friday being relatively quiet. The Tuesday peak in Louisville plus the low incidence of domestic trouble on Friday and Saturday is atypical, generally, as can be seen from the function for assaults in Detroit for 1964 (Lunden, 1967, p. 32). However, it is generally recognized that this type of crime is interpersonal and depends on conditions which exacerbate conflict between people. Long-term close contact is one of these conditions, but so are behaviors related to drinking and the handling of money in the household. Thus, when the above results were first observed the project staff almost immediately wondered if Tuesday might be a major pay-day in the city. A few calls confirmed that at least one major blue-collar employer in Louisville payed on Tuesdays.

The present data are rather sparce, however, and not too much confidence should be placed in either these data or the explanation offered above. Much more data is obviously needed but there is the suggestion here that domestic trouble may not show the usual "weekend peak" when other situational factors are timed differently. However, the present data is inadequate for a satisfactory examination of this issue.

Variations in domestic trouble with time of day is as one would again expect on the basis of past information

on crimes against persons. Frequency of reported FCIU runs show a peak load occurring during the 7 to 11 shift. Domestic trouble calls are lowest at about 5 A.M. and increase rather steadily across the day until about midnight. Figure 5-3 shows the frequency of domestic trouble runs reported by the FCIU in three hour blocks and comparison data in terms of murders in Allegheny County, Pa. from 1905 to 1940 (from Lundin, 1967, p. 38).

As can be seen, FCIU runs and murders vary similarly with time of day, again arguing for some common basis and supporting, though indirectly, the observation that a significant proportion of murders result from domestic disputes.

Who

A description of the persons involved in domestic trouble is perhaps one aspect of this data not generally available from crime statistics as usually summarized.

The age distribution for all disputants involved in the 89 reported crises is shown in Figure 5-4. A comparison is provided in terms of the age distribution of all persons in the 3rd police district (U.S. Census, 1960). As can be seen, minors are definitely under-represented, suggesting that few of these conflicts involve the regulation of children, directly. These conflicts as shall be seen later are for the most part two-adult phenomena. Conflict

occurs almost full blown in the 16-20 age group; presumably among young married couples. The subsequent five years seem even more conflicted, and here the function reaches its peak. After the peak at the 21-25 age group, the function returns to what might be considered its initial level and shows a brief plateau until couples reach about 45 years of age. The rate of reported family conflict decreases steadily after about 45 years but even at age sixty, some couples have not really eliminated severe conflict from their marriage.

It is perhaps instructive to compare the rate of depletion of the population with age to the rate of diminution of family conflict. This comparison from about year 30 onward suggests that conflict decreases only a little more rapidly with age than the supply of people available for conflict. Such a comparison, in turn, implies that adjustment in marriage does not necessarily improve with the age of the couples involved, or that as adjustment improves disruptive factors increase commensurately.

Racially, persons dealt with by FCIU officers were roughly proportionate in numbers to the racial composition of the district. FCIU officers dealt with 188 caucasoid persons and 18 negroid persons, which approximates the 94 to 6 percent racial distribution of the district.

The domestic trouble run brings police officers, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to a two-party conflict; mostly between husband and wife. Table 5-1 shows the frequency of cases according to the relationship of disputants as reported by FCIU officers on the Family Dispute Form. As can be seen, the family conflict is overwhelmingly a husband-wife phenomenon, and thereby a two-person confrontation. When all two-person cases are considered, they represent 83% of the cases. In 92% of the cases disputants were members of the same immediate family. This fact is reflected also in the breakdown of the sex of the main disputants with a total of 103 males and 103 females. Though similar totals can occur in various ways, these reflect the one man, one woman character of most domestic trouble calls.

As can be seen from Table 5-2, the man in most disputes was an unskilled or skilled workman and the woman, a housewife. In combination, the most frequently visited family was headed by an unskilled man and a housewife.

Of course, little can be said about these results without a similar breakdown on the 3rd police district as a whole. Since no such breakdown is available and our classification relies on the judgments of the FCIU officers, these results must stand as simply descriptive of the types of calls made by FCIU officers.

Where and Why

As might be expected by virtue of the nature of the persons involved, the dispute took place most often in an apartment or home, immediately outside such, and (only a few times) on the street. Table 5-3 shows the frequency with which the conflict took place within these various locations. As can be seen, only about 8% of these altercations occurred beyond the immediate surroundings of the home.

Finally, causes of these disturbances are not so easily determined, though, to be sure, the dynamics of the conflict are particular to the nature of the marital relationship. In an attempt to gain information of the causes of disputes trained officers were asked to report what they perceived to be the major cause of the immediate problem. A classification of causes for the altercation as recorded by the patrolmen is shown in Table 5-4. Row S of the table shows a classification done by Mr. Schanie while row D shows a classification done by Dr. Driscoll. A list of causes was jointly decided upon on the basis of general familiarity with Family Crisis Reports. Following this, the classifications of the reported causes of disputes was done independently by the two judges from the Family Crisis Reports.

There is a high level of agreement between the two judges in terms of the rank order of causes with disagreement in rank arising only in the eighth most frequent cause. Alcohol, psychological problems, infidelity, and independence problems head the list and account for the majority of conflicts. There is marked disagreement between judges on the frequency with which alcohol could be considered the cause of the conflict, though not enough disagreement to affect the ranking. However, this disagreement does reflect a stronger preference on the part of one judge for considering alcohol as a symptom of problems rather than as a cause of conflict. Whatever, most situations involved more than one of the listed causes and thus, were multiply caused. For instance, alcohol was involved in many disputes where it was not listed as the immediate cause by the officers. In 52% of the cases alcohol was involved, although in only 24 to 36% of the cases was it seen as the immediate cause of the conflict (other drugs were found in 5% of the cases).

Another way to look at causes of domestic disputes is to examine referral information both in terms of the agencies suggested and in terms of the officers' listed reason for making the referral. Table 5-5 lists the dispositions of FCIU cases. As can be seen, a sizable proportion of cases (35%) required only the services of the officers. In some

58% of the cases, referrals were made. Of these referrals, 60% were made to mental health agencies, 11% were made to service agencies, and 29% were made to legal agencies. This indicates that officers felt that crises revolved about mental health problems. Of the mental health referrals, the leading reasons given for the referral were marital or family counseling and alcohol and drug counseling.

Persons, whether drinking or not, were generally excited when the patrolmen arrived. Table 5-6 summarizes ratings by FCIU officers of the level of aggitation in terms of the scale points provided. In the 89 cases, sixteen assaults had occurred; nine of these with a weapon. Officers were assaulted without weapons twice. These facts, we think, support the contention made throughout this presentation that even though the orientation of the officers is to help, violence is all too likely and family crisis very often requires the police rather than the mental health worker.

Table 5-1

Relationship of Disputants from FCIU Reports

Husband-Wife	52
Husband-Wife-Offspring	7
Mother-Son/Daughter	6
Father-Son/Daughter	4
Common-Law Man-Woman	5
Unrelated Man-Woman	4
Husband-Wife-Relations	2
Separated Husband-Wife	2
Divorced Husband-Wife	2
Siblings	2
Other	3
	89

Table 5-2

Combinations of Husband-Wife Skill Level from FCIU Reports

		Wife			
		Housewife	Skilled	Unskilled	Total
Husband	Professional	1	0	0	1
	White Collar	2	0	0	2
	Skilled	11	5	5	21
	Unskilled	25	1	7	33
	Unemployed	3	2	1	9
	Other	2	0	0	2
		44	8	15	68

Table 5-3

Location of Dispute from FCIU Reports

Apartment or Home	71
Outside residence	
Porch	3
Yard	1
Other	7
Street	5
Car	2
	89

Table 5-4

Main Causes of FCIU Domestic Trouble Calls

	S	D
Alcohol	32	21
Psychological Problems--one or more participant	13	18
Infidelity--real or imagined	10	13
Restriction of Personal Independence	8	10
Money	5	6
Children--dispute over control	5	5
In Laws	2	1
Goal Conflict	2	3
Indeterminate	12	11
	89	89

Table 5-5

Disposition of FCIU reported cases

Arrest		7
Handled by Officer		31
Referral		51
		89
Type of Referral		
Mental Health Referral		37
Family and Children's Agency	17	
West Central Mental Health Center	10	
U. of Louisville Clinic	5	
General Hospital (Psychiatric)	3	
Church or Minister	2	
Service Referrals		6
Parkhill Area Council	1	
General Hospital (medical)	1	
HELP office	1	
Metropolitan Social Service	1	
Manpower Center	1	
Food Stamp Office	1	
Legal Referrals		18
Legal Aid Society	8	
Recommended Warrant	8	
Juvenile Court	2	
		61

Table 5-6

Frequency Distribution on Family Crisis Report for Item:

When you arrived, the parties were:
(N=206)

(2)	(7)	(16)	(52)	(22)	(28)	(59)
Calm			Agitated			Dangerously Violent



Figure 5-1. Domestic trouble runs made by the FCIU compared to all runs in the 3rd district.



Figure 5-2. Frequency of FCIU domestic trouble reports by day of week compared to daily variation in assaults in Detroit (1960, Lundin, p. 32).



Figure 5-3. Frequency of FCIU domestic trouble reports by hours of the day compared to the hourly average of homicides in Allegheny, Pa. (from Lundin, 1967).



Figure 5-4. Age of all persons included in FCIU reports compared to the age distribution for the 3rd district (1960 census).

APPENDIX B

Training Schedule

MASTER SCHEDULE FOR FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION TRAINING

Day 1

Orientation: Mr. Burton: Director of Public Safety

Chief Hyde: Louisville Division of Police

Dr. Driscoll: Philosophy of the Project

Questions and Answers

Presentation: Dr. Kemper, (U of L) The Policeman's Job and its Psychological Pressures

Discussion: What a Policeman Does and What He Should Do

Assignment: All Popular Press On Intervention Training.

Day 2

Feedback Session (Coffee)

Presentation: Dr. Bieliaskas (U of Cincinnati)--Current Concepts and Practice in Police Work

Discussion with Dr. Bieliaskas

Presentation: Dr. Driscoll (U of L) A Causal View of Behavior

Discussion with Dr. Driscoll

Assignments: Policeman as Philosopher, Guide, and Friend. Family Disturbance as a Police Function

Day 3

Feedback Session

Presentation: Dr. Driscoll (U of L) Effects of Early Experience: Some "Critical" Learning

Film: Roots of Criminality

Film: Emotions and Crime

Discussion with Dr. Driscoll

Presentation: Dr. Mainord (U of L) Changing Behavior

Discussion with Dr. Mainord

Assignments: The Delinquent and the Law

School Failures and Dropouts

Day 4

Feedback Session

Presentation: Dr. Meyer (U of L) Abnormal Behavior and How To Handle It

Film: Booked for Safe Keeping

Film: Depression

Film: Cry for Help

Discussion with Dr. Meyer

Presentation: Dr. Barrett (U of L Child Psychiatry) Children in Families

Discussion with Dr. Barrett

Assignment: Violence Like Charity Begins at Home

Day 5

HOLIDAY

Day 6

Feedback Session

Presentation: Dr. Murrell (Indiana U) Family Structure and Interaction

Discussion with Dr. Murrell

Presentation: Dr. Meyer (U of L) The Crisis as an Opportunity For Change

Discussion with Dr. Meyer

Assignments: What Makes a Marriage Happy

Divorce

Saving Your Marriage

Sexual Adjustment In Marriage

Day 7

Feedback Session

Simulation I
Intervention in Family Crisis I
Teams A, B, C

Teams D, E, F

Assignment: The Compassionate Cop

Day 8

Feedback Session

Meeting with Actors From Simulation I

Video-Tape Feedback and Commentary (Mr. Riddick--U of L)

Group Conferences: Dr. Meyer and Dr. Mainord

Assignment: Crisis Theory and Therapeutic Change in Small Groups

Day 9

Feedback Session

Presentation: Mr. Bloch (U of L)
Some Techniques of Conflict Resolution

Discussion with Mr. Bloch

Work on Reports on Simulation I

Field Trip: Family and Children's Agency

Film: Marked for Failure

Film: Under Pressure

Assignment: Family Therapy Mental Health--A Family Affair

Day 10

Feedback Session

Presentation: Mr. Amster (U of L)
Community Action Councils

Field Trips to Community Action Councils

Discussion with Mr. Amster

Presentation: Mr. Bloch--How to Make Referrals

Assignment: What Is Marriage Counseling

Day 11

Feedback Session

Simulation II

Team F
B
D

Team C
B
A

Assignment: Normal Crisis, Family Structure, and Mental Health

Day 12

Feedback Session

Meeting with Actors From Simulation II

Video-Tape Feedback with Commentary--Mr. Riddick

Group Conferences: Dr. Mainord and Dr. Meyer

Work on Reports on Simulation II

Day 13

Feedback Session

Presentation: Mr. Hettinger (State Department of Rehabilitation) Resources for Retraining for Employment

Discussion with Mr. Hettinger

Presentation: Mr. Skaggs (West Central Mental Health Center) Mental Health Referral System

Discussion with Mr. Skaggs

Presentation: Dr. Miller (U of L Child Psychiatry Center) Some Hints on Interviewing

Discussion with Dr. Miller

Film: A Message from No One

Day 14

Feedback Session

Simulation III
Teams C
D
F

Teams B
A
F

Assignment: Psychotherapy--A Helping Process

Day 15

Feedback Session

Meeting with Actors from Simulation III

Video-Tape Feedback with Commentary--Mr. Riddick

Group Conferences
Dr. Mainord and Dr. Meyer

Written Reports on Simulation III

Day 16

Feedback Session

Presentation: Mr. John Klotter (School of Police Administration U of L)--Legal Aspects of Family Crisis Intervention

Discussion with Mr. Klotter

Review of All Video-Tapes

Written Final Report on Simulations

Day 17

Feedback Session

Presentation: Mr. John Holland (Drug Abuse and Information Center) and Dr. Richard Smith (U of L) Drugs and Drug Cultures

Field Work Briefing

Field Work

Team A (with Mr. Riddick)
B (with Mr. Bloch)
C (with Dr. Meyer)

Day 18

Feedback Session

Reports on Field Interventions
Team A
B
C

Workshop: Data Forms
Captain Munn--Commander of Third District

Field Work

Team D (Dr. Mainord)
E (Dr. Driscoll)
F (Mr. White)

Day 19

Feedback Session

Reports on Field Interventions
Team D
E
F

Group Conferences: Dr. Meyer and Dr. Mainord

Day 20

Evaluation of Training

Commencement: Mr. Burton
Chief Hyde

APPENDIX C

Training Evaluation Questionnaire

Training Evaluation Questionnaire

THESE ARE STRICTLY ANONYMOUS----------DO NOT SIGN THEM

PLEASE BE FRANK IT WILL HELP US NEXT TIME

Recruitment Procedures

Adequate----------Satisfactory----------Inadequate

Comments:

Selection Procedures (interviews)

Adequate----------Satisfactory----------Inadequate

Comments:

First Day's Orientation

Adequate----------Satisfactory----------Inadequate

Comments:

Now rate the usefulness of various topics to you as a policeman. Please evaluate the topics without considering the quality of the presentation since we merely wish to know whether to include that topic (but perhaps not the same speaker) next time.

A Psychologists View of the Policeman's Job

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Modern Concepts and Practices in Police Work

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

A Causal View of Behavior

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Principles of Behavior Modification:

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Abnormal Behavior and its Management

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Practical Rules for Crisis Intervention

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Family Structure and Interaction

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Techniques of Conflict Resolution

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

The Psychology of the Black

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Techniques of Interviewing

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Legal Aspects of Crisis Intervention

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Drugs and their Effects on Behavior

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Now let us know what you think of the way in which the persons making the presentations did their jobs.

Orientation (Driscoll)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

A Psychologist's View of the Policeman's Job (Kemper)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Modern Concepts and Practices in Police Work (Bieliauskas)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

A Causal View of Behavior (Driscoll)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Principles of Behavior Modification (Mainard)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Abnormal Behavior (Meyer)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Practical Rules for Crisis Intervention (Barrett)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Family Structure and Interaction (Murrell)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Techniques of Conflict Resolution (Bloch)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

The Psychology of the Black (Neal)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Techniques of Interviewing (Miller)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Techniques of Interviewing (White)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Legal Aspects of Crisis Intervention (Klotter)

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

Drugs and their Effects (Smith and Holland)

Smith:

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Holland:

Adequate----------Acceptable----------Inadequate

Comments:

What topics would you want more on?

What topics would you like to add?

General Comments on topics and speakers:

Did you find the opportunity to ask questions and discuss topics with speakers useful?

Would you like the discussion sessions structured differently? How?

Now please turn your attention to the teaching dramas and intervention workshops.

How valuable do you think teaching dramas are in developing crisis intervention techniques?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable were each of the three teaching dramas used in this program?

Drama 1

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Drama 2

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Drama 3

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable was the video-tape replay of these situations in developing crisis intervention techniques?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable do you think it was to request written reports from you on your laboratory interventions?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable do you think watching live interventions of other teams (through one-way mirrors) was in developing intervention techniques?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable do you think meetings with the actors was in developing techniques of intervention?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

How valuable were the group conferences in developing crisis intervention techniques?

Indispensible----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

General comments on Intervention Workshops:

teaching dramas

watching other teams

video-tape playback

meetings with actors

group conferences

Ratings of Films and Readings:

Cross-out the titles of the films that you think should not be included next time

Roots of Criminality
Emotion and Crime
Booked for Safe Keeping
Depression
Cry for Help
Marked for Failure
Under Pressure
A Message from No One

Now go back and put an X beside those you really found valuable.

Cross off the titles of the readings which should not be included next time:

Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend
Family Disturbance as a Police Function
The Delinquent and the Law
School Failures and Dropouts
Violence like Charity Begins at Home
What makes a Marriage Happy
Divorce
Saving your Marriage
Sexual Adjustment in Marriage
The Compassionate Cop
Crisis Theory and Therapeutic Change in Small Groups
Family Therapy
Mental Health, a Family Affair
What is Marriage Counseling
Normal Crisis, Family Structure, and Mental Health
Psychotherapy--A Helping Process
Alcoholism--A Sickness that can be Cured

Now go back and put an X beside those you really found valuable.

General Comments on Films and Readings:

Now consider Referral Procedures:

Of what value were visits by personnel from agencies (Skaggs and Hettinger)

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Would you like more of these and if so from what agencies?

Of what value were field visits?

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Would you like more field trips and if so to what agencies?

Were the visist to the Community Action Councils useful?

Comments on Referral Procedures:

Now consider Field Work:

How valuable do you feel field work was in developing intervention techniques?

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

Would you suggest more field work?

What changes would you make in field work procedures?

How valuable were the reports of other teams on their field work and the discussion of these reports?

Essential----------Useful----------Unnecessary

Comments:

General Comments on Field Work:

Personnel Evaluations:

Please give us frank evaluations of the effectiveness of the personnel involved in the project.

Driscoll

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------Related poorly to officers

Comments:

Meyer

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------Related poorly to officers

Comments:

Mainard

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------related poorly to officers

Comments:

Riddick

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------Related poorly to officers

Comments:

Bloch

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------Related poorly to officers

Comments:

White

Very effective job---------Satisfactory----------Ineffective

Related well to officers----------Related poorly to officers

Comments:

What two or three things would you have liked to have more of?

Was the meeting with your Captain useful?

What changes in scheduling would you make?

What changes in the order in which you received things would you make?

Do you think the program could be run effectively in three weeks? Why?

Why not?

Any other comments:

Thanks

APPENDIX D

Evaluation Forms and In-Car Fil.

Officer Participant Questionnaire

The following questionnaire was drawn up to give us a better picture of the effects of crisis intervention training. Specifically, we want to know what the training has or has not meant to you in performing the duties of a police officer in crisis interventions.

Completion of the questionnaire should require only a few minutes. It will be appreciated if you complete this questionnaire on the day it is received and mail it back the next day in the return envelope provided within. Please do not sign your name, we want you to feel totally free in expressing yourself.

Please rate on the scales provided:

1. How much more or less force you have found necessary to employ in handling family crises as a result of your training.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A great deal less force			No Change			A great deal more force

2. How much more or less effective you are in handling family crises as a result of your training.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Much more effective			No Change			Much less effective

3. How much more or less welcome your presence in the homes of disputants is as a result of your training.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Much more welcome			No Change			Much less welcome

4. How much more or less receptive the disputants seem to what you have to say in family crisis interventions as a result of your training.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Much more receptive			No Change			Much less receptive

5. The type of recommendation you would give a fellow officer if he asked for your opinion concerning whether or not he should participate in a crisis intervention training of this sort.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Strongly encourage			Neutral			Strongly discourage

6. How much better or worse you feel you understand the nature of family crises as a result of your training.

:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Much better understanding			No Change			Much worse understanding

7. What do you think the advantages (if any) are of having participated in this training program?

8. What do you think the disadvantages (if any) are of having participated in this training program?

GENERAL COMMENTS:

Client Telephone Questionnaire

First of all, we wondered what you thought of the officers who were in your home the other day?

I would like to ask you a few more questions, if I may. For most of the questions there will be choices for you to make. I will just read the choices for a question, and they you can tell me which one best describes the way you feel on that question.

1. How friendly would you say the officers were? Would you say that:

   A. they were friendly like a stranger on the street;
   B. they were friendly like a neighbor;
   C. they were friendly like a big brother or sister.

2. How hard do you think the officers tried to help you with the problem that brought them? Would you say that:

   A. they tried very hard to help;
   B. they tried a little to help, but not much;
   C. they didn't try to help at all.

3. How helpful did you feel the policemen were in settling your problem? Would you say that:

   A. they were very helpful;
   B. they were a little helpful, but not much;
   C. they were not helpful at all.

4. How happy were you with the way the policemen handled the situation? Would you say that:

   A. you were very happy with the way they handled the situation;
   B. you think they handled it okay.
   C. you were unhappy with the way they handled it.

5. Did the way these police officers acted in your home change your opinion of police?

YES NO

If Yes,
Do you think:

More of the police?

Less of the police?

6. Did the policemen suggest somewhere you might go to see for help?

YES NO

If Yes, Where?_____

Did you go?
YES NO

If No, are you still thinking of going?
YES NO

7. Now that the police have visited your home, would you be more or less likely to call them back if you needed them?

MORE LESS

8. Have you ever been to an agency like the one the officers suggested you go to?

YES NO

9. Have the police ever been to your house before for something like they were there for the other day?

YES NO

If yes, what did they do that time?

I want to thank you very much for helping us with this; we appreciate your help. Goodbye.

Patrolman's Intervention Report Form

Circle where appropriate

1. Notification of dispute came via:

   L.P.D. self-observed directed by citizen

2. Time of notification was:

Month:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Day:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31					
Time:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24

3. Location: _____

4. Complainant(s):
   Name: _____

   Statement:

5. Dispute took place in Intervention took place

   X.....disputant's apt. or house.....X
   X.....other's apt. or house.....X
   X.....lobby, corridors, etc.....X
   X.....street.....X
   X.....recreation area.....X
   X.....place of business.....X
   X.....other_____.....X

6. Name of disputants:

	Race	Sex	Age
A. _____			
B. _____			
C. _____			

7. Occupation:

	A	B	C
Professional			
White-collar			
Skilled worker			
Unskilled worker			
Housewife			
Student			
Unemployed			

Position:

	A	B	C
Tenant			
Visitor			
Neighbor			
Businessman			
Other			

8. Relationships among disputants:

A is _____ of B

A is _____ of C

B is _____ of C

9. Situation and actions taken:

When you arrived, the parties were:

A_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
Dangerously violent — Agitated — Calm

B_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
Dangerously violent — Agitated — Calm

C_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
Dangerously Violent — Agitated — Calm

10. A. Weapon or assault on disputant(s):

____Assault with weapon

____Assault without weapon

____Threat with weapon

____Threat without weapon

____Kind of weapon if any_____

Weapon or assault on Officer(s):

____Assault with weapon

____Assault without weapon

____Threat with weapon

____Threat without weapon

____Kind of weapon if any_____

B. Drugs or alcohol involved:_____

11. Official Action(s) taken by Officers:

____aided, how_____

____made referral_____

____recommended complaint filed_____

____made arrest_____

12. Impressions:

What do you think the disputants thought of the way the situation was handled?

A_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
satisfied — neutral — dissatisfied

B_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
satisfied — neutral — dissatisfied

C_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
satisfied neutral dissatisfied

What do you think the chances the dispute will occur again are?

_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:
practically zero 50-50 for sure

13. Referrals:

Family And Children's Agency.....X

Kentucky Dept. of Child Welfare.....X

Legal Aid Society of Louisville.....X

Louisville General Hospital.....X

Metro Social Services Dept.....X

U of L Psychological Clinic.....X

West Central Mental Health Center.....X

Other_____.....X

family counseling.....X

marital counseling.....X

intervention for child/children.....X

legal service.....X

hospitalization:general/medical.....X

hospitalization:psychiatric.....X

alcoholism/drug abuse intervention.....X

welfare subsidy.....X

vocational counseling.....X

Other_____.....X

14. Initial action(s) taken by Officers:

15. A. What happened?

B. Why do you think it happened?

16. Reporting Officers: _____

_____

In-Car File

Location: _____
Number Street Apartment # Date Time

Complaintant(s) _____

Statement:

Names of disputants: Age Sex Race

(A) _____
Last First

(B) _____
Last First

(C) _____
Last First

Relationship(s):

A is _____ of B

A is _____ of C

B is _____ of C

Number of others involved: _____

When you arrived, the parties were:

(A): _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ :
dangerously violent excited calm

(B): _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ :
dangerously violent excited calm

(C): _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ :
dangerously violent excited calm

Weapons/assault involved:

Alcohol/drugs involved:

Patrolmen: _____

_____

APPENDIX E

Agency Letter, Referral Booklet, and Referral Form

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40208

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Gentlemen:

We at the University of Louisville Psychological Clinic are presently conducting a training and research program aimed at teaching twelve patrolmen of the Louisville Police Department to intervene more successfully in family crises and domestic disturbances than they have in the past. We have the goal of providing more appropriate services to families embroiled in acute and potentially violent conflict, while at the same time lessening the probability of injury to the officers attempting to calm the situation. Such intervention is conceptualized as having two facets: first, the immediate reduction of tension and violence-potential, and secondly, the referral of the problem family to appropriate agencies for professional treatment of the problems leading to the initial crisis.

From your experience you are surely aware that although most service agencies are over-burdened with cases, there are many persons and families in the community which could profit from these services but who are unaware of the availability of help or the means to obtain it. The police, because of their unique role in the street and community, frequently find themselves dealing with these problems and having insufficient information or training to intervene successfully or to make effective referrals. We are both training these twelve officers in successful intervention techniques, and providing them with information and a pocketsized booklet including the name, address, and a short description of services provided (abstracted from our knowledge and the 1969 Health and Welfare Council Directory) for each of more than twenty local service agencies which we feel to be most concerned with the type of problems likely to be encountered by the Family Crisis Intervention Unit. It is our

conviction that if these problem families can be effectively referred and rapidly accepted for services and treatment, they will require less service-time and service expense than if their problems are allowed to deteriorate further before gaining professional attention; in this regard the Family Crisis Intervention Unit can serve as an adjunct to the agencies in identifying and referring appropriate cases before they become chronic drains upon the agencies and the community.

Your agency is among those included in our referral booklet, and it is likely that you will receive referrals from the Unit within the next six months; these cases to be identified by a green referral slip (copy attached) or by oral recognition of the referring officer in case the referral slip is lost. We are sure that you will deal with these and all cases as rapidly and as effectively as possible (otherwise we would not have included your agency as a referral possibility), but in order to determine whether or not the program is succeeding we need feedback information regarding how many of the Unit's referrals actually follow through for service and assistance. Each officer will record every referral that he makes, but we need other means for determining whether or not the referred family appears for help.

To this end we would like to contact your agency once a month to check on how many of our referred families follow through after the crisis intervention is completed. We would wish to present you with a list of families referred to your agency (some months, of course, there may be none) for verification with your intake records. It would be convenient if you would be able to collect and return all of our referral slips coming over your desk. Realizing that there may well be administrative problems involved in this procedure, we are eager to discuss with you alternative methods of gaining this needed information in order to minimize the inconvenience to your staff. In exchange for your cooperation we will be willing to inform you of our results at the conclusion of the project, if you so desire.

We would appreciate it if you will circulate this letter and the sample referral slip to all members of your staff likely to encounter our referred families, perhaps then posting it for continued access by your staff. We would be happy to hear from you (at 636-4577) regarding alternative means of gathering follow-

up information, or just to discuss the program with you more fully. Thank you for your consideration and cooperation.

Sincerely,

James P. Block
Clinic Staff Member

JPB:cd

Enclosure

LOUISVILLE POLICE CRISIS INTERVENTION PROJECT

REFERRAL INFORMATION

Following is a list of agencies capable of handling referrals, with information about services offered and eligibility requirements. Make sure you (1) fill out a referral slip and record the referral for follow-up purposes and (2) be specific in your description of the services to be provided.

*Alcoholics Anonymous – 582-1849 — 319 W. Jefferson St.
Group self-help for alcoholics and their families. Voluntary contributions. — Louisville, 40202

*Bridgehaven, Inc. – 637-1454 — 1423 S. Fourth St.
Non-residential vocational and social rehabilitation for individuals who have experienced psychiatric difficulties. Sliding scale. — Louisville, 40208

*Bureau of Rehabilitation Services, Department of Education — 585-5911, ext. 320
Evaluation, counseling, training, and job placement for physically and mentally handicapped persons. Applications taken on Mondays. — 600 W. Cedar St. Louisville, 40203

*The Catholic Charities Agency – 587-0948, 584-0949
Treatment and social services for Catholic families, unwed mothers, and children. Adoption and foster-care programs. Sliding scale. — 809 S. Brook St. Louisville, 40203

*Child Guidance Clinic – 584-9701 — 206 E. Chestnut St.
Diagnostic and treatment services for emotionally disturbed children and their families. Emergency service for crisis intervention. Long waiting list. Sliding scale. — Louisville, 40202

*Domestic Relations and Miscellaneous Branch of Louisville Municipal Court
Jurisdiction in marital and family difficulties and neighborhood quarrels. — City Hall Annex Louisville, 40202

*Family and Children's Agency – 583-1741 — 1115 Garvin Place
Counseling for marital problems, parent-child difficulties, individual emotional adjustment, and all types of problems affecting the family or its members. Sliding scale. — Louisville, 40203

*HELP Office – 583-7727, 583-7728 — 321 W. Oak St.
Effective referrals of individuals and families to appropriate agencies. Pastoral counseling, limited emergency financial aid; no fees. — Louisville, 40203

*Home of the Innocents – 585-2713 — 202 E. Chestnut St.
Short-term care for children between the ages of six weeks and six years, in cases of maternal illness or acute family crisis. Sliding scale. — Louisville, 40202

*Jewish Social Service Agency – 587-0774 — 118 S. Second St.
Providing casework services to Jewish families and individuals regarding personal and family problems. Financial assistance. — Louisville, 40202

*Kentucky Department of Child Welfare – 584-8351
To provide casework and protective services to children and families, investigate child abuse cases, counsel unwed mothers, and provide casework services to juvenile delinquents and their families. No fees. — 981 S. Third St. Louisville, 40203

*Kentucky Department of Economic Security, Bureau of Public Assistance – 585-5911
Financial and medical assistance, and Food Stamp distribution. No fees. — 600 W. Cedar St. Louisville, 40203

*Kentucky Department of Economic Security, Division of Employment Service – 585-5911
Vocational counseling and testing, job placement. No fees. — 600 W. Cedar St. Louisville, 40203

*Kentucky Department of Mental Health, Central State Hospital 245-4121
Diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of individuals with psychiatric problems. — Anchorage, Kentucky 40223

*Legal Aid Society of Louisville – 585-2387
Legal advice and services, and court representation provided to those unable to afford private counsel. Domestic difficulties, debt adjustment, juvenile, and civil cases handled. No fees, but family income must be less than $40.00 per week plus $10.00 per dependent; no advice given over the telephone. — 422 W. Liberty St. Louisville, 40202

*Long Run Association of Baptists – 587-6735
Family, child, and individual counseling and social services available, in addition to day-care services for children. Sliding scale. — 400 E. Chestnut St. Louisville, 40202

*West Central (Louisville Area) Mental Health Center – 584-2204 (After 5:00 p.m., 584-2203)
Group and individual treatment of psychiatric complaints, family therapy, and diagnostic services. Sliding scale. — 1123 South Third St. Louisville, 40203

*Louisville General Hospital – 582-1621 — 323 E. Chestnut St.
Emergency medical treatment, in-patient and out-patient services in all specialties of medicine. Sliding scale. — Louisville, 40202

*Metropolitan Social Services Department – 589-3060
Providing emergency financial assistance to residents of Jefferson County, casework services for neglected or delinquent children and their families, pre-trial court services (including family studies, psychological diagnosis and evaluation) for Juvenile Court, residential shelter and treatment for neglected and delinquent children. — 520 W. Jefferson St. Louisville, 40202

*Psychological Clinic, University of Louisville — 636-4577
Diagnostic services regarding psychological problems, behavior modification, family and marital therapy. Sliding scale for therapy, fixed fee of $25.00 for diagnostic work. — 103 Life Sciences Bldg. Belknap Campus Louisville, 40208

*Suicide Prevention Service, Inc. – 584-2203
Telephone emergency counseling, round the clock, in addition to referral services. — 1123 S. Third St. Louisville, 40203

Louisville Police Department
Family Crisis Intervention Program

Date: _____

To:

Agency: _____

Address: _____

Telephone: _____

This will introduce:
Mr. (s) _____

Address: _____

who has expressed interest in using the services offered by your agency.

Officer: _____

APPENDIX F

Certificate

The University of Louisville

has awarded to

this certificate

signifying completion of the

Crisis Intervention Training Program

of the University of Louisville

Psychology Clinic on this July 24, 1970

Project Co-ordinator

Clinic Director

APPENDIX G

Sample Simulation and Field Intervention Reports

Simulation No. 1

Team C

J. Hughes
J. Sherrard

As we were approaching the doorway to an apartment in a low income neighborhood, we could hear loud and profane talk coming from inside the apartment. When we got to the door, we did not hear any signs of a confrontation that would have made us enter the apartment by the use of force. We knocked on the door and heard a voice inside shout "shut up, someone is knocking on the door." We waited a moment and when no one answered we knocked again. This was done for two (2) reasons, one being that you do not know what you will confront if you open the door and walk in and, second, by getting someone to answer the door you take one person out of the argument for the moment.

When the door was opened, we noticed four (4) people inside the apartment, a fat sloppy male in a drunken condition, a bleached blond in slacks, blouse and a scarf on her head, a teenage male in a purple undershirt, flare pants and sandals, and the teenage girl that had answered the door.

We asked the teenage girl if she had called the police and what was the trouble. Before she could answer, the fat male shouted that they didn't call the police and that there was no trouble. He then started to argue with the blond and teenage male. The girl that had answered the door asked us in stating that they needed help. Before we entered the apartment, we looked through the crack between the door and door facing to be sure no one was behind the door. As we entered the apartment, Officer Sherrard stepped to the left of the door and I, Officer Hughes, stepped to the right. We had determined while standing in the doorway that the older male was the main cause of the argument. Officer Sherrard by talking to him got him separated from the rest of the people and into the living room for the purpose of listening to his side of the problem. The mother began to shout at her children as to who called and what were the police doing in her home without a warrant. The mother then began shouting at me and ordering me to leave. When I made no effort to go, she started to berate me about my age, stating that I was too old to be on the police force and why wasn't I drawing my old age pension. It seemed to shock her when I refused to argue with her about this reference to my age. After 20 years on the force, this kind of verbal

abuse does not bother me. The mother continued to berate me and shout at her children while walking around the kitchen. At this point I stated, "Let's all sit down and talk like humans and not act like animals." This was a mistake referring to animals because the mother took offense to it and started shouting, "I am not an animal." The daughter succeeded in getting her mother quiet and to sit down at the kitchen table where she and her brother were already sitting. The mother then went to the table and sat down. At this point I removed my hat and asked permission to sit down and talk. After sitting down I asked what was the cause of this argument and requested that only one person talk at a time.

The mother spoke first, stating that the older man who was not her husband but with whom she was living, but made a point of informing me that as soon as he got a job they were going to get married, came home drunk and started to pick on her children. The son sat at the kitchen table not saying anything about the problem but trying to get his mother to stop shouting and abusing me because he was afraid she would be arrested. The daughter then started to tell her side of the problem and attempted to get us to take the older man out of the apartment. The mother became very angry at the daughter for trying to get us to take the man from the apartment, thinking she was trying to get us to arrest him. While I was trying to explain to the daughter that we couldn't take the man out of the apartment without a warrant and attempting to talk her out of getting one, stating that a warrant was only a temporary solution to a problem, the mother interrupted by offering me a drink from a half-full bottle of gin. I refused, but she insisted and I made another mistake by refusing in a positive way that I did not drink on or off duty. I should have stated that I did not drink on duty and asked for a cup of coffee. I then attempted to give the daughter advice on what to do about the older man's drinking problem. I advised her to get him to go to the proper people for help or that she could go through General Hospital's Mental Department. At this time, Officer Sherrard entered the kitchen with the older man and informed the rest of the people involved in the problem that we were going to take him to General Hospital for medical treatment for his nerves, which he had told Officer Sherrard was the cause of his drinking.

The mother started crying and shouting, "Don't trust them, (the Police), they are going to arrest you." After assuring her that we were taking him to General Hospital and not to jail, we left the apartment and this ended our part of the workshop.

Simulation No. 1

Team F

J. Oney
R. Parsons

After being admitted into the apartment we observed four people, appearing to be a man, his wife, a teenage son, and a teenage daughter. The apartment was a mess, the table had been upset, and the family was engaged in a violent argument. The man and the boy were engaged in a fight. The daughter was hysterical and crying; the mother kept repeating that there was no trouble here.

We tried to get control of the situation. Officer Oney separated the boy and the man and asked the daughter and the son to walk into the living room. The woman and the man, with whom she was living, remained in the kitchen with Officer Parsons. The woman was upset and became very belligerent to the officers from the time they arrived.

Officer Oney got the boy and the girl to sit down in the living room and subsequently calmed them down. The officer asked them what was going on and from what the two said the man had been living with them for 3 months; he did not work, he stayed drunk constantly. The mother worked at Jeffy's Restaurant about 14 hours a day. The son was 19 years old, did not attend school, and did not work. The daughter was 17 years of age.

The daughter said that the man had made advances toward her and the boy was taking up for her when we arrived.

The son and the daughter said that they wanted the man out of their apartment and everything would be okay. The mother wanted the man to stay.

We explained to the daughter and the son that there was very little that we could do, but we would do what we could to help them and that they would have to help themselves somewhat. We asked the daughter if she had told her mother about the man's advances toward her and if she had talked this over with her mother. We also advised her since she was 17 years old that she could go to Juvenile Court and if she told us the entire situation that it would help her.

We explained to the son that if the situation did not improve that he could go to the Police Court Clerk Office and take out a warrant for the man for beating,

but before he did so that he should talk this over with his mother and let her know what was going on while she is at work.

To keep them from fighting again after we left, we asked the man to leave as we did and asked him not to return for a while, giving everyone involved a chance to calm down.

We feel that the actors did a very good job, maybe too good, as they knew they would not be arrested and we had more trouble getting them calmed down than it takes in most cases.

If we had to do the act over, we believe we would do it about the same way as we did before. I, (Parsons), would have taken advantage of the mother's getting mad at Oney and the fact that she would not talk to me. I should have done a better job on this one case, or I should have tried to do a better job.

I, (Oney), should not have said anything to the mother about the man's advances toward the daughter until the mother was calmed down enough to reason with.

Simulation No. 2

Team F

R. Parsons
J. Oney

We were called to an apartment on a loud party. After we were permitted to enter the apartment, we found that there were 2 black males, 4 black females, and 1 white male. All seemed to be teenagers. After some time, we found that the one black male who rented the apartment was 18 years of age. We tried for some time to gain control of the situation, but found that it was impossible. After the white youth passed out on the floor of the apartment from what appeared to be the effects of glue, and after glue, gin and possibly marijuana was found in the apartment, we felt that our only hope to gain control and also to maybe help these people was in the form of arrest. This we did and took everyone to headquarters where we turned the juveniles over to the Youth Bureau and arrested the people over 18 years of age. We feel that in this situation we would take the same action if we had it to do over. The acting was ample but left something to be desired.

Simulation No. 2

Team B

J. Brown
J. A. Beckman

Upon entering the scene we observed a group of 8 youths: 1 adult and 7 juveniles.

The females were extremely cooperative, but we couldn't communicate with one and/or two of the males.

There were at least four (4) major violations that were extremely obvious, and although we didn't arrest the group, in reality we probably would have.

We should have discussed the problem between ourselves and taken an appropriate action.

In reality we should have taken the juveniles to Youth Bureau and charged the adult accordingly.

This probably would have been the only way to get complete control and maintain it, plus, by placing them under arrest it would be the only way to get them treatment.

Simulation No. 3

Team A

J. Ansman
M. Lawless

The most realistic situation of the three that we encountered. Gave you a feeling of being able to accomplish something constructive. You were not the scapegoat of the situation. You were only acting as a calming ingredient to soothe and recommend an agency that could possibly alleviate the problems in this family with their cooperation.

As we entered the apartment after being admitted by approximately a ten year old female who stated, "That's the woman who drew a knife on my mother" and pointed to a lady sitting on the northwest corner of a couch.

At this time, we concluded there was a hostile attitude between the child (Gail) and the lady (Helen) due to their argumentative tendencies toward one another.

After a short period of time, we ascertained that the father (Marty) was passive mostly by his actions of sitting down by his own motivation and not getting actively involved. The main problem then being a separation of the disputants, the child and the aunt. The mother (Sally) did not seem that argumentative so it seemed feasible to not separate her. It also seemed feasible to let the aunt remain seated and not attempt to move her to another location. This left getting the child aside so as to stop the bickering between her and the aunt.

Using several means of separation and obtaining as much information as possible, we then got the individuals together as a group and recommended Family and Children's Agency to work with them in group therapy. Also we got each individual to promise to attend, enlisting the father's cooperation in that endeavor.

Left them with the feeling we wanted to help and to call us if they needed us again.

We would have handled the problem most generally the same in a realistic situation under the same elements.

Note: We felt that the child needed discipline but didn't want to encounter another obstacle by entering this. Also that there was more involvement but did not want a complete history.

Simulation No. 3

Team F

R. Parsons
J. Oney

After being admitted into the house by a lady which appeared to be in her late 40's, we observed 3 other persons, a man in his late 40's, a girl in her 20's, and a younger girl age 9, believed to be the granddaughter.

The lady that invited us in explained to us that her daughter and son-in-law had had a fight. He (son-in-law) had whipped the child and the son-in-law was on his way over to get the daughter and grandchild. And the granddaughter was by a previous marriage. The daughter then stated that he did not whip the child; he only shook her. And the reason for the fight was that she had found out he had lost his job.

After getting the family quieted down and seated, through the door came the son-in-law. Another argument started between the son-in-law and father-in law; we separated them. Officer Parsons took the son-in-law into the kitchen. Officer Oney remained in the livingroom with the rest of the family. After getting the situation quieted down, the daughter joined Officer Parson and her husband in the kitchen. The grandchild remained on the couch with her grandmother and the child seemed quite upset.

After talking to the son-in-law and daughter, we suggested to the son-in-law he should go to the Unemployment office to seek help in finding employment of his ability, which he agreed to do. A referral slip was given. After explaining to them this was a family matter, we suggested they consult with the Family and Children's Agency, and we would call so they would be expected, which they agreed to do the following day. A referral slip was given.

At this point the daughter, son-in-law and grandchild wanted to go home. The grandparents felt the child should stay with them. After we talked to the grandparents suggesting they make an appointment with the Family and Children's Agency, we felt there was not enough understanding between the grandparents and son-in-law. We left feeling that all parties would follow through with the referral, with maybe one exception, the grandfather.

On the Street Intervention 7-2[illegible]-70

Officer J. Hughes
Officer J. Sherrard

Received call to 140 Court to see the lady. Upon arrival we were met at the door by a lady who stated she wanted us to talk to her husband.

When the lady started to tell her story, we recognized this as being the run that 303 had made to South Third on 7-21-70. We let Mrs. C. tell her side of the story again but did not let her go into too many details being as she had already told her story to this unit.

We let Mr. C. tell his side of the problem, and it seemed his version was that his wife drank, refused to stay home and always wanted to spend money when there was none.

After informing them of the unit and our functions, we got them both to admit that drinking was the problem and got them to promise to contact Family and Children's Agency for an appointment and not to continue the argument.

On the Street Intervention 7-[illegible]-75

Officer R. Parsons
Officer J. Onay

We received a run to 4017 T. Boulevard on trouble. We were met by a lady at the front door, who stated that her husband, Clyde, W/57, had taken a large amount of pills, and had called his sister to tell her good-bye. We found Clyde in the front room and after talking to him found that he had taken some pills and also had drank a half pint of whiskey. We found out from his wife, Mildren, B/3[illegible], that he had done the same thing about a year ago. We took Mr. B to General Hospital for treatment and also charged him with D.C. We found out from talking to his wife that he had had a stroke about 2 years ago and that he has been very depressed ever since. We found out that he was a paint and body man before his illness and that he took pride in his work. This was Mr. B's second marriage and that his 27 year old son came by the house, and that they often went fishing together. After talking to Mrs. B for some time, we found out that Mr. B knew he needed help and had tried to get in Central State, but was refused because of his condition, not able to do work at Central State. Mrs. B was sure that he would accept help if it were offered, so we gave him a referral to West Central Mental Health Center, and told her to talk to her husband as soon as he was released from General Hospital and before he started drinking again. She said she would. We also told her that if she needed any help or if Mr. B wanted to know more about this agency, to give us a call and we would be glad to help in any way we could. We feel that if his drinking problem is stopped and that he is able to get some type of employment, that this may solve this family crisis.

On the Street Intervention 7-21-70

Officer J. Ansman
Officer M. Lawless

While assigned to Beat 307, the above Officers responded to a call from Car 320 Lt. Kiper to meet Car 305 Officers Caswell and Griffith along side M Pawn Shop, this being on South 4th Street.

On our arrival, we observed a young woman and a small child sitting in a Rambler station wagon being interviewed by the Officer out of Car 305. Officer Griffith gave Officer Lawless a partial runlown of the facts and Officer Caswell remarked, "I will let you college boys handle this." They then left. We continued to interview the young woman, and we asked to sit down by her in her car. After getting into the car, we ascertained that her name was Toni, W/F/27, and that she lived at 3932 R with her husband, Tracy, and 4 year old son, Jimmy.

She explained that she had left home after her husband came home drunk and had threatened the young boy by grabbing for him across the table and had also stated he was going to kill her. Getting more facts we found they had been married for six years. That this happened before in Chicago, Illinois, and other locations. That she had lived with him two (2) years prior to marriage. That both have previous marriages. She had been pregnant at the time of their marriage. That she had never taken a warrant in any of these incidents of his beating her. Also his relatives had been living in their four (4) room home for the past eight (8) months using his support, creating a situation between her and him. That his drinking problem had intensified due to these conditions. That he seemed less responsive to her since their arrival. We also found that for approximately sixteen (16) months after their arrival in Louisville that they had fair personal relations. That he was a good provider. After getting her to admit this wasn't a one-sided affair, that she in herself was not perfect, we asked if there was any possible way she could get her husband to admit and comply with the fact that they both need help. We explained we were a Family Unit within the Police Department. Our immediate concern was not arrest but of help and providing help to resolve their problems. We recommended Family and Children's Agency at 1115 Garvin Place, gave her a referral slip to that agency, explained its functions to her and also gave her a pamphlet

showing her the functions. Due to the situation of transportation, we advised her to call and that they might possibly send someone to her home to confer with her.

She seemed extremely interested in our advise and gave us an indication that she would call and seek help. Though she admitted her "love" had dwindled for her husband, she said that if possible she wanted to keep the marriage intact.

The reason we didn't talk to the husband was due to his being under the influence. But we did suggest that after she arrived home if more trouble developed to call us and we would be glad to come and talk to both of them together.

All in all, she seemed very responsive and gave us the impression she was more satisfied than when we had originally met her. It gave us a feeling that we had accomplished some success in our contact.

APPENDIX H

Publicity

Louisville Courier Journal	June 30, 1970
Louisville Courier Journal	July 8, 1970
Louisville Magazine	Summer, 1970
Television Coverage	Two news spots One interview spot
The Charlotte News	Jan. 14, 1971
Charlotte Observer	Jan. 15, 1971

A Family Explodes

And a team of officers gets a new kind of training

Staff Photos by Bill Luster

OFFICERS John A. Beckham, left, and James N. Brown work with actors Joe Hardy and Susan Kingsley in calming a realistically staged family dispute. The performance is monitored from behind one-way glass and a video-tape recorder, foreground, preserves the session for review by the participants.

By JOHN FILIATREAU
Courier-Journal Staff Writer

The police entered a potentially explosive situation. Four frantic persons were engaged in a furious family squabble.

Gloria, a fortyish waitress holding down two jobs, had been berating her common-law husband, Lou—unemployed now for about two years and usually drunk. Gloria's son, Buddy, had just revealed to her that Lou had molested her daughter, Betty.

All hell had broken loose. Lou continued to down great gulps of gin. A bottle of Pepto-Bismol stood on the table in case of emergencies. Everybody raved. Everybody cursed.

Family Disputes Mean Danger

Lou had sprayed beans all over the floor, displeased because they were cold. Now he cursed the heat, wiped his sweaty brow with a rag, and scowled as the two policemen entered the tenement apartment.

The policemen were apprehensive, and with good cause—the FBI says 22 per cent of all police on-duty fatalities involve family or neighborhood disputes.

Apprehensive even though they knew the "family" consisted of four professional actors.

One of the policemen who entered the apartment, James N. Brown, is a Negro. The other, John A. Beckman, is white.

"You get the hell out of my house!" Gloria yelled at Brown. "You're not fit for anything but picking cotton!" She told her son, "It's bad enough that he's a pig, but he's a BLACK pig!" She added a host of more salty racist epithets.

Brown made Lou sit down and stop shouting, crossed his arms and smiled at Gloria. Beckman tried to separate Lou from the rest of the family.

But Lou got up again and pointed at Beckman. "He's got his club on him," he screamed. "He's here for business."

Before the visit was over, Brown had cajoled a promise from Lou that he would go to an employment agency to see about getting work. Beckman had calmed the rest of the family enough to be confident, at least, that no murders would be committed.

Later, Beckman said of the visit, "I feel like a lost ball." Brown commented simply, "This was one of those cases where the situation's the same after you leave."

The squabblers in the feud were only play-acting. But the policemen were real-life members of the Louisville Police Department, participating with relish in a four-week program designed to enable them to handle personal and family altercations without making the situation even worse.

A bit of fiction, however, can come near to reality if it's a close enough copy.

Gloria in reality Lynne Hardy, an actress presently performing at Beef 'n' Boards in Simpsonville—came to Brown later with a real-life apology.

"I want to apologize," she said. "But they told me to do it, they told me to do it. But I couldn't get you heated up."

"You'll never do it that way," Brown answered with a smile, adding that an officer learns to take a lot of verbal abuse. Beckman wasn't so sure.

"I was ready to hit her," he claimed with a smile.

Crime Commission Is Sponsor

Yesterday's was the first mock-battle workshop session held as part of the "crisis intervention training" program at the University of Louisville. Each of six teams of volunteer policemen was called on to handle the same problem as smoothly as possible. Their performances were recorded on video-tape.

The program, being held at the university's psychological clinic under the direction of Dr. Robert Meyer, clinic director, and Dr. James Driscoll, a staff member, is financed by a $27,000 federal grant administered through the Kentucky Crime Commission and by about $75,000 in state and local money.

Driscoll said yesterday that the Crime Commission has been the "prime mover" in the project, and that the university chose to administer it as a public service. He added that the support of Louisville Police Chief Col. C. J. Hyde has been invaluable.

The policemen in the course range in age from 23 to about 50 and have been policemen one to 20 years. Two are Negro. Six are from the 3rd District (roughly, in southern Louisville), four are from the 2nd (central), and two from the 4th (western).

The actors and actresses enlisted to do battle were Lynne and Joe Hardy (Lou) and Michael Anthony (Buddy) from Beef 'n' Boards, and Susan Kingsley (Betty) of Actors Theatre of Louisville. They were rounded up by David Semonin, production stage manager for ATL.

Brown and Beckman, young officers who had never worked together before, were the second team on yesterday's agenda. The first, made up of John Ansman and Marvin Lawless, have been on a beat together for four years.

The professional performance of Ansman and Lawless was smoother and more practiced, honed by many nights together in similar tenements with similarly tortured persons.

Ansman was initially direct in dealing with Lou: "If you don't calm down I'm going to have to do something I don't want to do and that's get violent." Later, Ansman gave Lou his last cigar—then, finally, referred him to Alcoholics Anonymous.

JOE HARDY, an actor, plays out his role in a family spat as Louisville Patrolman James N. Brown tries to calm him.

Lawless sat without a word for a while, then pleaded quietly, "I think everything will be fine if we just talk together."

After some 45 minutes, the whole bunch was getting pretty sociable. Gloria offered the officers a drink, got very nasty when they refused it. Lou continued to mumble about "Alcoholics Animus." Absolutely incorrigible, that man.

During all this, U of L psychologists sat behind a one-way glass partition in an adjoining room, taping the whole thing and jotting down notes. Today, the officers will receive a critique of their performances while viewing themselves on videotape.

It took Brown and Beckman just as long as the first team to calm the storm, and Dr. Driscoll laughed with Ansman and Lawless in the monitoring room as the time dragged on.

"They said 'We'll probably be out in 10 minutes,'" Driscoll told them. "They were laughing at you all for being in there so long."

The third team to try the problem was comprised of Jack Hughes, a 20-year veteran on the force, and Jim Sherrard, once named best-dressed man on the force. They've worked together for two years.

The four policemen who had finished their sessions rocked the walls of the room with laughter when Gloria stopped the graying Hughes cold with the question, "Aren't you collecting an old-age pension?"

Before very long, however, Hughes was sitting comfortably at the kitchen table, talking to Lou. Their session lasted only about 20 minutes.

Hughes and Sherrard chose to take Lou to General Hospital, so doctors could check on a "nervous condition" he claimed to have.

Hughes later said he thinks the program is a good one. "It brings out the fact that this is a very serious problem in the community," he said. "Usually, a policeman thinks about this type of call as a 'necessary evil.'"

He said the future success of the officers trained in the program "depends upon the amount of cooperation we get from the rest of the department."

Modeled After New York Program

The experimental program is modeled after a New York City project started last year by Dr. Morton Bard, a psychologist at City College of New York, who came to Louisville as a consultant for the U of L project.

The U of L staff decided to add the video-taping to Bard's program to give the officers greater feedback on their performance. The drama and video-taping sessions are managed by Carlton Riddick, a clinician at the university and a clinical psychologist at the Presbyterian Theological Seminary.

'Crisis Intervention Training'

12 Policemen Learning How to Calm Family Spats

By STAN MACDONALD
Courier-Journal Staff Writer

Twelve volunteer Louisville policemen yesterday began a four-week course to help them deal effectively with domestic and neighborhood disputes.

Hopefully, the officers will learn how to peacefully calm personal squabbles without adding fuel to the fire and how to provide the disputants "limited help" in resolving their conflict.

The program, called "crisis intervention training," is believed to be the second of its kind in the nation. It's being held at the University of Louisville Psychological Clinic under the direction of Dr. Robert Meyer, clinic director, and Dr. James Driscoll, a clinic staff member.

The "highly experimental" program is being financed by a $27,000 federal grant administered through the Kentucky Crime Control Commission and by about $75,000 in state and local money.

It is modeled after a New York City project started last year by Dr. Morton Bard, a psychologist at City College of New York.

The 12 Louisville officers at the orientation class yesterday ranged in age from 23 to about 50. Two were Negro and 10 white.

Driscoll said the majority of a policeman's time is spent dealing with problems of personal relationships such as disputes between husband and wife, tenant and landlord, neighbor and neighbor and parent and rebellious son or daughter.

The FBI reported that intervention in domestic and neighborhood disputes accounts for 22 per cent of police fatalities (while on duty), Driscoll said. Frequently in these conflicts arrests are made and warrants issued, yet the root cause remains unresolved and the conflicts repeat themselves, he added.

Perhaps the most unusual part of the new training program will be the mock disputes staged by actors from Louisville's Actors Theatre. Paired policemen will be called upon to settle the "raging" theatrics while video-tape cameras record their actions.

To provide more lasting help, the policemen will learn about a host of local social agencies to which they can refer disputants for professional guidance.

At the end of the program, Driscoll and his staff will go with the officers on actual trouble calls in the city. For one year or more the policemen will be asked to compile data on the disputes they handle and this will be compared with the record of an untrained group of policemen, Driscoll said.

The twelve policemen will be assigned to the 3rd District in southern Louisville, which Driscoll said contains a variety of housing and living conditions.

If the program is successful, Driscoll and Meyer hope that it will be incorporated into police training school or continued at the university.

"We must learn we have to change," Police Chief Col. C. J. Hyde told the trainees yesterday.

The Badge is the same

BUT LOUISVILLE'S CHANGING TECHNIQUES IN FIGHTING CRIME ARE PAYING DIVIDENDS

A small motorcycle zipped out of a dingy alley and faded away into the gathering shadows of a young night. The man bent over the handlebars wore a leather jacket and a World War I helmet which kept his long hair out of his eyes.

An elderly woman, retrieving her evening paper, paused to watch him fly by. In her eyes was a look of disgust for what she considered to be just another young punk out looking for trouble.

The young man on the motorcycle was looking for trouble all right—the kind that could prevent the woman from becoming a victim of a crime. The kid on the bike was a full-fledged member of the Louisville Police Department assigned to a special unit that roams the city's high-crime areas.

This special, fast-moving police unit was formed by Police Chief C. J. Hyde and City Safety Director George Burton shortly after Burton became civilian head of the department 11 months ago.

The idea is to have a group of policemen whose actions are completely unpredictable, thus keeping the underworld off balance.

The men in this special unit do not know what role they will play until they actually report for work each evening. According to Burton the men may be dressed as hippies or even as women. They may be moving around the city on motor bikes or even tricycles. Their assignment is decided each night by a computer that analyses the city's crime picture on a day-to-day basis. Where the computer spots a concentration of crime —that's where the special force of detectives will go to work that night.

The project apparently is showing good results. In a recent speech, Louisville's Mayor Frank Burke noted that the work on this special unit has reduced reported crimes in specially-selected areas by as much as 80 per cent.

Since then, the Louisville & Jefferson County Crime Commission has come up with hard statistics indicating that the over-all crime rate throughout Louisville is showing a modest, but promising, decrease—what the Commission called a "substantive, actual reduction of crime."

Such statistics are music to Burton's ears. Maybe, he seems to say with a broad grin, maybe it's beginning to pay off. What Burton is talking about is his pet theory, one that stresses a sociological approach to control crime in today's ever-changing society.

Burton and Hyde are two men who are not content with the old way of doing things. They are not afraid to rock the Establishment's boat and make a few waves, because they believe in what they are doing. Their views, however, are not shared by every member of the department. In fact, there has been a great deal of resistance to change, especially among the veteran, hard-nosed policemen.

Burton argues that traditional police work has been essentially physical. But, he adds, we are in a changing society and policing has to change with it.

Over 92 per cent of the hours put in by today's policemen, Burton says, involves dealing with social problems. Only 8 per cent of a policeman's time today, he says, is spent in the traditional concept of chasing criminals.

For example, Burton says, Louisville patrolmen are called to settle domestic squabbles, to rush sick and injured to hospitals and to unsnarl the city's ever-mounting volume of traffic congestion.

The best example of this new approach to policing in Louisville is the

Part of the Louisville Police Department's new approach is the Family Crisis Intervention Program, which details trained officers to cope with domestic disturbances. Counsel from U. of L.'s Psychology Department and mock squabbles staged by the West Side Players helped prepare the first group trained.



Monday through Friday on WHAS TELEVISION 11 and WHAS RADIO 84

ONE MAN'S OPINION

BOB SCHULMAN

July 27-28, 1970
Crisis Intervention: "It works!"

The police car pulled up to the curb, and one of the officers shouted at Prof. C. J. Amster of the University of Louisville psychology faculty. "Hey, Doc!" the cop yelled delightedly. "It worked. It worked!"

The officer was one of 13 who just last week completed a new six-week course in how better to deal with family fights and neighborhood brawls. Prof. Amster has been on the faculty team, led by U of L psychologist Robert Meyer. And the cop's happy, curbside report reflected the fact that, already, he and his partner had been able to apply, with great result, their newly-learned techniques of what's tamely called "crisis intervention."

Don't let the tame words fool you. If the feedback from the first 13 "crisis intervention" officers continues as good as it's been these first few days; it could promise one major step toward peace-keeping and crime-prevention. For it would reflect a breakthrough in dealing with the situations that come over the police radio with deceiving mildness as "family trouble", "a disturbance"... but often are, in fact, hot spots of tension that consume up to 40 per cent of a policeman's time, constitute the single biggest cause of homicides, and in the past have led to many an officer's death or injury.

The Louisville course, financed partly through the local Crime Commission with federal dollars, has been patterned after New York's crisis-intervention program, begun almost four years ago, But the U of L faculty have given the course here a more practical turn, the in particular avoided the mistakes of a "sensitivity" effort that turned most cops off two years ago.

In the class sessions, professional actors staged mock brawls into which the cop students intervened, while the others watched on closed-circuit TV and then joined in evaluation. Later, the participating university faculty accompanied officers in actual squad car runs.

Today, members of that first class say they dig the techniques of separating and talking separately to a man and wife angrily about to do each other in. They have a better insight into the psychology of white-heat anger and insults. And when a wife beaten by her alcoholic, jobless husband asks an officer what to do, the cop can do more than just congest police time and court dockets by saying, "Well lady, get a warrant." Now, the especially-trained officers know more about the clinics and agencies ready to take such people in hand, for a try short of court and jail.

Crisis-intervention training is but one of many encouraging programs started in Louisville since Police Chief C. J. Hyde's professional "smarts" have been augmented by those of FBI veteran George Burton as Public Safety Director. A special complaint desk now sees to it that cops making disturbance runs get a better idea of what's awaiting them. Meantime, other efforts toward professionalism enhance policing, as a career for black and white men with healthy IQ's and a good mixture of guts and compassion.

From a few stick-in-the-mud sources, Burton and Hyde got some complaints when they detached the first 13 crisis-interventionists from regular duty, long enough to take the course. But they think it's a whale of an investment. I agree. Don't you?

Bob Schulman.... One Man's Opinion

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Officer: We're Sold

Domestic Crisis Unit Is Endorsed

By DICK HAMMERSTROM
News Staff Writer

Three Louisville policemen brought personal testimony to Charlotte today that a police family crisis intervention unit can be successful.

"We're sold on it, said Patrolman John Beckman of the Louisville Police Department.

"LIKE A LOT of officers, we questioned it and were against it until we saw how it worked in the field. We can see the results now," Beckman said.

Beckman, Sgt. James Oney and Patrolman James Brown were at the Law Enforcement Center today to discuss the program with Charlotte policemen.

Charlotte has received $31,000 in federal funds to start a similar program here. The progam is designed to have specially trained officers deal with domestic trouble and family disturbances.

The Louisville program was started with a federal grant of $118,000. The 12 officers enrolled in the program completed 100 hours of study in behavioral science at the University of Louisville before taking the field.

"We were doubtful about it even after we took our training," Brown said. "But once we went out, handled the disputants and saw actual results, we feel differently.

"We feel sure the policemen here in Charlotte will be opposed to it. Some people are opposed to anything that's new regardless of how good it is."

Oney said the problems of policemen answering domestic calls will continue "so why not be better prepared for it."

FBI statistics show that one of every five officers killed in the line of duty were answering domestic disturbance calls.

"Officers are scared of domestic quarrels because we never know what to expect," Beckman said. "I was too, before I knew how to handle it.

"NOW WE FEEL better prepared when we go into a house. We still have problems with them, but we can see results."

The officers said they haven't been assaulted on any domestic calls since the program began in July.

By the same token, the officers said, other officers answering domestic calls have been assaulted 19 times.

Charlotte police hope to start their family crisis unit early next month. Training for the officers will be conducted by the Family and Children's Services.

Charlotte Observer
Jan. 15 1971

STARTS FEB. 2

Police Project May Aid Domestic Calls

By JIM MITCHELL
Observer Staff Writer

If there's anything a police officer hates, it's being called to settle a domestic fight.

"It's the second most dreaded call" (after an appeal for help from a fellow policeman), a veteran Charlotte officer said Thursday.

And there's good reason for this. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics show that 40 per cent of the assaults on officers occur when they're trying to settle family squabbles, as do the deaths of 20 per cent of the officers killed when on duty.

This need not be the case, three officers from the Louisville Police Department told Charlotte police officers Thursday.

These men, Sgt. James Oney, John Beckman and James N. Brown, participated in a pilot project involving training in family crisis intervention. Similar training will begin for selected Charlotte policemen Feb. 2.

The results, the Louisville policemen said, were astounding, and included:

—No assaults on the 12 men who had the specialized training. Twelve other men, working in the same district, were assaulted 19 times.

—A decrease in the number of assaults within the homes in the districts. If this occurred in Charlotte, local officers think, there might be fewer murders.

—The successful solution of many families' problems. "We by no means settled every domestic dispute," Patrolman Beckman said, "but we had much more success than there ever had been before."

The six-month project, which was funded by a $118,000 federal grant, began with four weeks' training, most of which was held at the University of Louisville Psychology Clinic.

"We had 100 hours of classes in the behavioral sciences and some realistic confrontations with domestic crises through the use of actors brought in from New York," Beckman said.

Two officers would confront the actors in a role playing situation which was watched from behind a one-way mirror and put on video tape.

"Feedback from the actors was also helpful," Beckman

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New Project May Aid Charlotte Police When Called To Settle Domestic Fights

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said, "because they told you what you could have done to make them feel better.' "

The result, the officers agreed, was that they had a new concept to use when they went on patrol.

"In the past, there were only three choices in a very complex, highly emotional situation," Beckman said.

"We could tell the person who appeared threatened to get a warrant. We could take sides. Or, if we saw a violation of the law, we could make an arrest.

"Now, we have many techniques which we vary according to the situation." Among those Beckman listed were:

—Isolating the major combatants into separate rooms while keeping the other officer in view at all times. ("Remember, it's an explosive situation.")

—Having each officer hear both sides of the story.

—Refer those involved to any public agency which might be of help. (One aspect of the training program was to inform the officers of just what kind of help was available in Louisville.)

—Have each party promise to follow a particular plan of action for 24 hours if the other party will make a similar promise.

"The most important thing, however, is that the people could see that we really cared," Beckman said. This was especially true when the officers made follow-up calls.

According to Charlotte Sgt. G. D. Bridges, who went to Louisville to see how the system worked, the results are not only fewer assaults and better family relations, but also good relations between police and the public. "People actually call up and ask for certain officers to help them," he said.

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